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Abstract 
 
 
 In the post 9/11 world, Canada can no longer be perceived as a safe resource base 
for supporters of anti-state political terrorism. As a signatory to international conventions 
against terrorism and its financing, Canada has mandated its National Security agencies 
to target groups, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who, prior to 
9/11, freely operated within Canada. Still, the LTTE, who have fought a civil war against 
the Sinhalese authorities of Sri Lanka, have historically enjoyed substantial financial 
support amongst the more than 200,000 Tamil expatriates living in Canada.  
 This major paper examines the causes that compel many Tamil Canadians to 
continue to fund the LTTE despite enjoying relative economic and social stability in 
Canada. Central to this major paper is a survey administered to Tamil Canadians that 
examined the nature of the nationalistic sentiments felt towards the motherland and 
towards the general objectives of the LTTE. It will be argued that despite these 
sentiments, Tamil Canadians have a strong desire to find a peaceful solution to the 
conflict. This major paper will conclude by exploring how Tamil Canadians and Canada 
can work together to eliminate financial support to the LTTE and bring peace to Sri 
Lanka. As this major paper was being submitted for final approval, the LTTE leader and 
some of his commanders were killed by the Sri Lankan Army, who claimed a complete 
military victory over the LTTE. However, despite the government’s euphoria over the 
apparent end of the conventional war, the fight against terrorism is far from over.
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Introduction  
 The underpinning of any insurgent group is its ability to raise the required funds 
to support all its members and activities. Without the constant infusion of capital, 
freedom fighters and terrorist organizations would not be able to carry out their mission 
(Ehrenfeld, 2005). For example, it would have been extremely difficult for Al-Qaeda to 
plan and execute the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in the 
United States if it had not enjoyed a steady flow of cash. To this end, Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) experts estimated that Al-Qaeda spent approximately $30 million per year 
prior to the 9/11 attacks in order to sustain its activities and spent between $400,000.00 
and $500,000.00 on the 9/11 attacks (Jacobson & Colon, 2006). Since this successful 
attack on the United States, in Canada, the financing of terrorism has become one of the 
strategic priorities of the government to safeguard national security. One of the 
organizations long suspected of using Canada as a location and source of terror 
fundraising has been the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam also known as the Tamil 
Tigers or LTTE.  
It is believed that the Tamil Tigers continue to be active in using intimidation, 
extortion, drug trafficking, money laundering, and charities in Canada to fund their war in 
Sri Lanka (Chalk, 1999). These claims, if substantiated, suggest that the LTTE is not only 
in violation of Canadian law, but is also breaching international laws. Based on an 
analysis of the strategic objectives and tactics of the LTTE, a number of countries, 
including Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have listed the LTTE as a 
terrorist organization and are taking steps to cut off its fundraising activities (Jayasekara, 
2009; Public Safety Canada, 2006).  
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It could be said that the old Maoist theory of “counting on one’s own strength” 
has been the aphorism of the Tamil people since the beginning of their conflict in Sri 
Lanka (Bettelheim, 1988). This statement is even more pragmatic considering how the 
LTTE have managed to finance their activities against the Sinhalese government. Not 
surprisingly, a well-organized insurgent group requires capital to support recruitment, 
training camps, housing, food, equipment, explosives, conventional and unconventional 
weapons, forged identity papers, travel documents, and to pay the families of suicide 
bombers (Bhaumik, 2001; Ehrenfeld, 2005).  
In Canada, recent police investigations have uncovered evidence that elements of 
the Tamil Diaspora have been involved in supporting the LTTE and raising money for its 
cause ((Bell & Hall, 2008; Bell, Hamilton, & Humphreys, 2008a, 2008b). This is a 
growing concern because Canada is internationally committed to combating terrorism, 
but is perceived as one of the main fundraising locations for this group. There is no doubt 
that the Tamils of Sri Lanka, particularly since that country’s independence from England 
in 1948, have suffered from discriminatory policies and practices, as well as violence 
perpetrated by the Sinhalese majority (Wilson, 2000). Over the years, strong nationalistic 
sentiments developed among many Tamils. These sentiments have remained with its 
citizens, even as they fled Sri Lanka following anti-Tamil pogroms (Wilson, 2000). 
Although Tamils have settled around the world, nationalistic sentiments have remained 
very strong. Therefore, this major paper will include a discussion of the nationalistic 
fervor of the Canadian Tamil Diaspora and its role in enticing some Canadian Tamils to 
fund the war in Sri Lanka. Perhaps new Canadian strategies will need to be developed to 
ensure that funds raised by the Tamil community are stopped or intercepted before they 
reach the LTTE. 
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In order to understand the current conflict, the financing of the LTTE, and the 
relationship between nationalistic sentiments and financial support to the LTTE, this 
major paper will be divided into five chapters. Chapter One will examine the historical 
context of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka. In this chapter, the emergence of the 
LTTE will be analyzed in addition to an examination of Tamil nationalism, its link to 
terrorism, and its manifestations within the Tamil Diaspora. Chapter Two will focus on 
the financing of terrorism from a Canadian perspective. In order to demonstrate the 
process of terror financing in Canada, a case study will be used to exhibit how the LTTE 
used elements of the Canadian Tamil Diaspora to finance its war in Sri Lanka. Chapter 
Three will discuss the methodology used for the survey undertaken for this research. In 
effect, an on-line survey of a sample of Tamil Canadians was used. Chapter Four will 
analyze and discuss the survey results. Chapter Five will explore how Canada and Tamil 
Canadians can work together to eliminate the financial support to the LTTE in Canada 
and bring peace to Sri Lanka.  
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Chapter One: The History of the Conflict, the Rise of the 
LTTE, and the Nexus between Nationalism and Terrorism 
 
1.0 History of the Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict 
 
 Sri Lanka is located in the Indian Ocean near the southeastern tip of India. The 
country has a population of approximately 20 million individuals and is divided into three 
main ethnic groups: (1) Sinhalese; (2) Tamils; and (3) Muslims.  
Figure 1: Map of Sri Lanka 
 
 Together, these three groups represent most of the country’s entire citizenry ("Sri 
Lanka: In Encyclopaedia Britannica," 2007). Aboriginal people, known as Veddas, who 
account for less than 1,000 individuals, also inhabit Sri Lanka (U.S. Department of State, 
2008). Although many Veddas cherish their ancestral identity as hunter-gatherers and 
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have managed to maintain their thousand-year old traditional way of life, relentless 
pressure from the surrounding dominant communities has contributed to many 
Aboriginals having become absorbed into the mainstream Sinhalese or Tamil societies 
(Obeyesekere, 2001; U.S. Department of State, 2008). The Sinhalese,1 who account for 
nearly three-quarters (74.0 per cent) of the population, are concentrated in the southern, 
western, central, and north-central parts of the country. The Tamils, who account for just 
over 8% of the population, are principally established in the northern and eastern parts of 
the island ("CIA World Factbook," 2007; "Sri Lanka: In Encyclopaedia Britannica," 
2007). The conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils is believed to date as far back 
as the 14th century, when a South Indian dynasty, called Arya Chakaravartis, seized 
power in the north and founded a Tamil kingdom (De Silva, 2005). This kingdom, 
located near the Jaffna peninsula, soon expanded southward and initiated conflicts with 
the Sinhalese in order to exact tribute from the south-west and central regions held by the 
Sinhalese (De Silva, 2005; "Sri Lanka: In Encyclopaedia Britannica," 2007). The 
confrontations between the two factions created a political division that weakened the 
island and made it prone to foreign invasions ("Sri Lanka: In Encyclopaedia Britannica," 
2007).   
Around 1505 AD, the Portuguese landed near Colombo and were met by friendly 
Sinhalese with whom they later entered into a commercial trade agreement (Zeylanicus, 
1970). In time, the Portuguese gained control over areas of the coastal regions that had 
once been part of the Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms. Portuguese attempts to conquer the 
central part of the island, however, were never successful. During the Portuguese period 
                                                 
1 The Sinhalese are believed to have come to Sri Lanka from northern India starting in the 5th century BC 
("Sa Majeste La Reine c. World Tamil Movement," 2006; "Sri Lanka: In Encyclopaedia Britannica," 2007).   
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of rule, Christianity was introduced as was Western-style education and culture (Herath, 
2002).  
 The Dutch were the next European power to arrive in Sri Lanka in the early 
seventeenth century. By 1658, the two European powers entered into a war that saw the 
Portuguese defeated and expelled from the island (Herath, 2002; Zeylanicus, 1970). One 
century later, the Dutch suffered the same fate, this time at the hands of the British, who 
expelled them and took over the lowlands of the island, which was later renamed Ceylon 
(De Silva, 2005). Ceylon, like most British colonies, was organized on the basis of the 
military, strategic, economic, and political convenience of the British Empire (Cohen & 
Corrado, 2005). Furthermore, little to no consideration for the historical hostilities among 
ethnic groups was given to these colonies whose ethnic groups or tribes were forced to 
exist within the colonial administration boundary (Cohen & Corrado, 2005).  
 As long as British rule remained autocratic, the rivalry between the Tamils and 
the Sinhalese remained below the surface. On February 4, 1948, Ceylon gained full 
independence from England. This raised the expectations of all its people for a better 
future ("BBC News: History of the Conflict in Sri Lanka," 2006; Herath, 2002; "Sri 
Lanka: In Encyclopaedia Britannica," 2007). However, a new Sinhalese majority 
parliament would soon favor a revival of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism to the detriment 
of the other minorities, including the Tamils and the Muslims (De Silva, 2005). 
  
1.1 Sri Lankan Independence  
 On February 4, 1948, Sri Lanka (formerly known as Ceylon),2 became an 
independent nation after more than 150 years of British Colonial rule ("Sri Lanka: In 
                                                 
2 Ceylon was the name given to the country by the European settlers. The country officially changed its 
name to Sri Lanka in 1972 ("Sri Lanka: In Encyclopaedia Britannica," 2007). 
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Encyclopaedia Britannica," 2007). At first, it seemed that elite members of the two main 
ethnic groups, the majority Sinhalese and the minority Ceylon Tamils, would put their 
cultural differences aside and rule the island nation in harmony. As mentioned earlier, the 
expectation of a better future was high and all of the different communities were eager to 
free themselves from the remnants of colonial bonds and revive their language, religion, 
and culture (Herath, 2002; Zeylanicus, 1970). Unfortunately, relations between the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils eroded within a decade.  
In 1948, the Sinhalese United National Party (UNP), led by Don Stephen 
Senanayake, passed legislation depriving more than one million Indian Tamil plantation 
workers of their Ceylonese citizenship (Bose, 1994).3 This was followed the next year by 
another piece of legislation, the Ceylon Elections Amendment Act, which deprived the 
Indian Tamils of voting rights (Makenthiran, 2004; Wilson, 2000). These actions caused 
Indian Tamils, constituting 13% of the population, to be left powerless in the state (De 
Silva, 2005). It is also important to note that the taking away of the citizenship and voting 
rights of Indian Tamils was not initially perceived by Ceylon Tamils as a discriminatory 
act because both groups spoke Tamil. From the beginning of independence, no political 
party, including the Sinhalese and Ceylon Tamils, was willing to accept Indian Tamils 
either as an integral element or as citizens of Sri Lanka because they were considered 
outsiders brought on the island by the British (Herath, 2002). Furthermore, left-wing 
political groups, who traditionally were opposed to the UNP, considered the Indian Tamil 
workers as possible allies to defeat the UNP during general elections. Consequently, the 
                                                 
3 The Tamil people of Sri Lanka comprised two main groups: the Sri Lankan Tamils, who are long-settled 
descendants from southeastern India, and the Indian Tamils, who are recent immigrants, also from 
southeastern India. However, the Indian Tamils are migrant workers who were brought in under British rule 
to work in the tea plantations. Together, these two groups account for approximately 8.5% of the total 
population. Muslim Sri Lankans, who speak Tamil, account for approximately 7% of the total population. 
They are descendants of the Arab traders of the 10th century ("CIA World Factbook," 2007; "Sri Lanka: In 
Encyclopaedia Britannica," 2007).   
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citizenship legislation served to assuage fears that Indian Tamils would support and vote 
for left-wing political groups and bring down the UNP (De Silva, 2005). Thus, from 1948 
to 1956, and despite the woes of the Indian Tamils, Sri Lanka experienced a relatively 
stable period under the leadership of the United National Party (Zeylanicus, 1970). 
During this phase, major development projects were introduced in an effort to raise the 
standard of living in the country through irrigation and land settlement programs in the 
dry zone (Zeylanicus, 1970).4 These programs, which included colonization, the building 
of hydro-electric facilities, and the establishment of cotton and sugar plantations, were 
also intended to directly enhance the conditions of the peasantry in both the Tamil and 
Sinhalese areas (Zeylanicus, 1970).  
Although the intentions of the government may have been sincere, Ceylon Tamil 
opinion changed, especially after the 1956 passage of the discriminatory Official 
Language Act. From that moment, Ceylon Tamils began to interpret the previous and 
contemporary actions of the Sinhalese government, such as the disenfranchisement of 
Indian Tamils, the colonization schemes, and the Sinhala-only language law, as 
“Sinhalese concealed agendas” (Herath, 2002; Zeylanicus, 1970). Regardless of whether 
this conclusion was correct, relations between the two ethnic groups deteriorated (Herath, 
2002).   
Between 1956 and 1965, Ceylon, under the leadership of the Sri Lankan Freedom 
Party (SLFP), became a troubled country. During this period, the country saw an 
awakening of racial and religious tensions between the two nations. As the political and 
racial situation worsened, anti-Tamil riots erupted. Repression of the Tamil language 
                                                 
4 Sri Lanka features two climatic areas: a wet zone in the southwest and a dry zone in the north and east. 
The wet zone receives an average precipitation of more than 3,810 mm (150 in.) each year, while some 
areas of the dry zone receive only 1,270 mm (about 50 in.) of rain each year (Sri Lanka's Climate, 2007). 
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eventually fueled demands by the Tamil minority for an independent state ("Sri Lanka:  
History of the Civil War," 2007).  
In the early 1970s, a new Tamil political party, the Tamil United Liberation Front 
(TULF), was created to represent the interests of the Tamil people and seek an 
autonomous or independent state. However, radical Tamil youth, who were not satisfied 
with the TULF’s non-militant approach, formed a militant wing, which later splintered 
into a number of groups. One of these groups became the LTTE (Herath, 2002; The 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2007).  
The late 1970s and the early 1980s witnessed a short period of quiescence in 
relations between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. During this period, many changes were 
made in language policy which benefited the Tamils (De Silva, 2005). For example, the 
controversial university admission policy, passed in 1971, was modified to make it more 
equitable for Tamil students by no longer compelling them to obtain higher aggregate 
marks than their Sinhalese counterparts (De Silva, 2002).   
Despite attempts from moderates on both sides to restore peace to the island, 
radical Tamils increased their violence against the state which responded by increasing 
their level of violence (De Silva, 2005). Savagery on the island reached an all-time high 
in July 1983, when an anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo and in other Sinhalese areas killed 
up to 3,000 Tamils and created another 150,000 war refugees (Bose, 1994; "Sri Lanka:  
History of the Civil War," 2007). It is believed that these events, among others, such as 
the burning of ancient Tamil books at the Jaffna library in 1981 by a group of anti-Tamil 
thugs, eventually contributed to promoting strong Tamil nationalist sentiments and led to 
the initiation of an all-out war between the Sinhalese state and the LTTE (Knuth, 2006; 
Peris, 2001; Sabaratnam, 2003; Wilson, 2000). 
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1.2 Legislated Discrimination 
As mentioned above, discriminatory laws were passed against Indian Tamils 
shortly after Ceylon became an independent nation. Although one could argue that these 
laws were draconian and unfair, the Ceylon Tamil elite, which at that time, formed a very 
small inclusion within the Sinhalese government, were also to blame for the misfortunes 
of the Indian Tamils as the former also voted in favor of legislation detrimental to Indian 
Tamils (Wilson, 2000). However, when the Sinhalese government passed laws that 
discriminated against the Ceylon Tamils, who were no longer included within the 
Sinhalese government, a profound change took place among Tamils, leading to an 
alliance of all Tamil-speaking people, whether they were Ceylon Tamils, Indian Tamils, 
or Tamil-speaking Muslims (Wilson, 2000).   
 For the purposes of this major paper, one event which signaled the beginning of 
Tamil nationalism will be examined. As mentioned above, in June 1956, the Ceylonese 
government, which had followed a policy of using Sinhala and Tamil as its official 
languages, decided to introduce the Official Language Act (Rupesinghe, 2006). The Act 
dictated that the Sinhala language would be the sole official language of Ceylon 
(Rupesinghe, 2006). Furthermore, the Act provided a clause stipulating that if immediate 
implementation was impracticable, the language or languages currently in use could be 
continued until the necessary changes were able to take effect. However, these changes 
had to be completed before December 31, 1960 (De Silva, 2005; Rupesinghe, 2006). The 
implication of this legislation was enormous as it created genuine fear in the minds of all 
minorities and limited access to public employment for Sinhala-speaking people only 
(Rupesinghe, 2006). From its inception, the legislation had negative consequence on 
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inter-ethnic relations. This gave rise to a series of protest campaigns, both inside and 
outside the legislature, eventually leading to communal violence (Herath, 2002; Wilson, 
2000).  
Although very few Sri Lankan scholars argued that the Official Language Act was 
not discriminatory and did not lead to a deterioration of Sinhalese-Tamil relations 
(Wilson, 2000), it could be debated that, although the intentions of the Sinhalese 
government were not necessarily discriminatory, they derived from a political desire to 
ensure the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) a victory over its political opponent, the 
United National Party (UNP). In order to better understand this issue, one must 
appreciate the political context of Sri Lanka in 1956. At that time, there were several 
political parties, two of which the SLFP and the UNP, dominated the political agenda. 
The Tamil electorate was mainly represented by the Tamil Federal Party (FP) (Herath, 
2002). A fierce rivalry existed between the UNP and the SLFP, whose leader, S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike, had been a minister within the UNP. Bandaranaike’s non-secular views 
and his penchant for a Sinhalese Buddhist revival had earlier caused a major crisis within 
the UNP, and, in 1951, he was forced to leave the party (Bose, 1994; Herath, 2002; 
Zeylanicus, 1970). Later that year, he formed the SLFP.  
During the 1956 general elections, Bandaranaike and the SLFP appealed to a 
large majority of Sinhalese Buddhist voters by presenting a one-point political platform 
that was encapsulated by the words: “Sinhalese-Only”. Under this platform, the SLFP 
promised its electorate that Sinhala would be the sole official language of Sri Lanka 
within twenty-four hours of it coming to power (Bose, 1994). At stake was much more 
than just a language issue. Sri Lanka, under the neo-colonial system, had reserved 
approximately 90% of government employment for a privileged 10% English-speaking 
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minority comprised of both Sinhalese and Tamil people (Bose, 1994). The adoption of 
Sinhala as the official language meant that members of the vernacular-educated Sinhalese 
majority would now have a chance to seek lucrative and coveted government jobs (Bose, 
1994). However, the situation was quite different for the Ceylon Tamils, who under 
British rule, and with moderate means of subsistence, had managed to give their children 
an English education. Therefore, a class-distinction between the English-educated and the 
vernacular-educated arose (Bose, 1994). Anti-English sentiments soon turned into anti-
Tamil sentiments among the vernacular-educated Sinhalese Buddhist majority (Bose, 
1994). 
Enticing a considerable number of Sinhalese voters as a result of its “Sinhala-
Only” language platform, the SLFP swept the 1956 general elections with a large 
majority over its rival, the UNP, and, as promised, legislated the Official Language Act 
("Dates of nomination, election, dissolution, and duration of Parliaments," 2007; Wilson, 
2000). However, this action unleashed a Buddhist culture and Sinhala language revival. 
In effect, Sinhalese nationalism was aroused by the Buddhist clergy who gained more 
political influence (Bose, 1994). It is not clear whether the Oxford-educated 
Bandaranaike fully realized that his strategy to gain power would awaken racial tensions 
between Sinhalese and Tamils.5   
                                                 
5 Bandaranaike attempted to redress the injustices his Sinhala-Only Act had caused the Tamil people and 
other minorities. However, despite his good will, his efforts were in vain. He was assassinated in 1959 by a 
Buddhist monk holding extreme nationalistic views ("Bandaranaike, S.W.R. D. In Encyclopaedia 
Britannica," 2007; Rajasingham, 2007; Zeylanicus, 1970). 
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1.3 The Official Language Act Analyzed  
  
The implementation of The Official Language Act by the Sinhalese SLFP party’s 
agenda had three main effects: (1) the SLFP won the 1956 elections by appealing to the 
mass majority of Sinhalese people; (2) it ensured the party would remain in power; and, 
(3) it demanded a proficiency in the Sinhala language in the civil service in order to 
equalize economic opportunities among a majority of disfavored Sinhalese people. The 
enactment of the Sinhala-Only legislation immediately provoked a wave of protest 
among minorities. This was particularly true among the Tamil population which felt that 
the Act restricted their own language rights (Wilson, 2000). Furthermore, the Act 
impeded Tamil civil servants from obtaining salary increments and promotions unless 
they were fluent in Sinhala (Kearney, 1978; Rupesinghe, 2006; Van Dyke, 1976). The 
Tamil people reacted by organizing peaceful protests which the state considered 
unacceptable. Anti-Tamil violence, arguably condoned by the government, erupted as a 
result (Nissan, 1998). 
 By imposing Sinhala and making it the only official language of Sri Lanka, the 
government directly attacked the identity of Tamil-speaking individuals.  
In addition, the Act came after a series of measures, such as the earlier 
disenfranchisement of the Indian-Tamils and the continuous state-sponsoring of 
Sinhalese colonization of Tamil areas.6 Justified or not, the Tamil people saw these acts 
as tactics designed by the government to annihilate their cultural identity, attack their 
                                                 
6 Shortly after independence, Sinhalese people migrated from the Deep South to settle in the Tamil-
dominated Eastern province under the auspices of state-sponsored programs, such as irrigation projects.  
However, since it is alleged that some of these projects never benefited the Tamil people who lived in these 
areas, Tamil opinion is that the programs were part of a Sinhalese strategy to destabilize the demographic 
and economic predominance of Tamils in the Eastern province and the non-peninsular areas of the North 
(Bose, 1994; Manogaran, 1996; Tharmalingam, 2007).  
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dignity, and deny their recognition as one of Sri Lanka’s founding nations (Rupesinghe, 
2006). To the Tamil people, the Official Language Act  was unacceptable, discriminatory, 
and oppressive because it placed their language in an inferior position, forced them to 
learn Sinhala, and made it much more difficult for them to obtain government 
employment ("Indictment Against Sri Lanka," 2007).   
Peaceful protests against the Act staged by Tamils soon turned into anti-Tamil 
violence as Sinhalese mobs manhandled protesters while the police looked on 
(Thavarajah, 2007). The tension between the Tamils and the Sinhalese escalated, and, in 
1958, a series of anti-Tamil riots erupted in Colombo ("Ceylon Placed Under Curfew 
After 18 Slain," 1958). During these events, Tamil people were attacked by angry mobs 
in buses, trains, and on the streets. In addition, Tamil shops were attacked and looted 
(Thavarajah, 2007; Zeylanicus, 1970). The city riots, which lasted approximately ten 
days, led to the death of more than 150 people, most of whom were Tamils ("BBC News: 
Timeline Sri Lanka," 2007; Thavarajah, 2007).  
The direct consequences of the Act, such as language discrimination, and to the 
level of anti-Tamil violence it engendered, contributed to the ethnic divide between the 
Sinhalese and Tamils (Thavarajah, 2007). In effect, the passing of the Official Language 
Act was considered by the Tamil leadership as a socially injurious act (Wilson, 2000). 
The direct and indirect consequences of the Act were catastrophic for Sri Lanka as it 
eventually contributed to a civil war.  
It is also interesting to observe the government’s response to the crimes 
committed against the Tamil people during some of the Tamil’s peaceful protests. Tamil 
leaders resorted to the principle of satyagraha or non-violent civil disobedience, as 
practiced by Gandhi, during peaceful protests to show their discontentment with the 
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Official Language Act (Wilson, 2000). However, the government chose not to use the 
criminal justice system to respond to the acts of violence perpetrated by Sinhalese mobs 
against the Tamil people.  
The peaceful protest of June 6, 1956 at Colombo’s Galle Face Green7 is an 
example of the state’s condoning anti-Tamil violence as it deliberately neglected to keep 
the peace and failed to take punitive actions against the Sinhalese assailants (Wilson, 
2000).8 These deliberate omissions/failures contributed to anti-Tamil sentiments and to 
the escalating violence in the following years ("BBC News: Timeline Sri Lanka," 2007). 
Had the state taken decisive actions against the Sinhalese mob, further violence, such as 
the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1958, might have been averted. 
 As mentioned, the passing of the Official Language Act may have been a real-
politic decision by Bandaranaike to ensure that he became Prime Minister and to ensure 
that his party won victory in the 1956 elections. Although this hypothesis cannot be 
definitively tested, Bandaranaike did later work out a compromise known as the 
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact or BC Pact of 1957 with Tamil leaders. The pact was 
meant to provide for a wide-ranging decentralization of administration and devolution of 
powers to Tamil areas of the northern and eastern provinces. This included the 
recognition of Tamil as the official language in those areas (Bose, 1994). However, the 
accord collapsed when, under pressure from the Sinhalese Buddhist clergy, Bandaranaike 
had to break his word and abrogated it (Bose, 1994; PBS.org, 2006). It may never be 
known whether Bandaranaike had any intention of canceling the agreement from the 
                                                 
7 Galle Face Green is a promenade in the heart of the financial district of Colombo. The promenade 
stretches for one-half kilometer along the coast (Galle Face Green, 2007).  
8 It is alleged that President S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike issued directives to Deputy Inspector General of 
Police, C.C. Dissanayake, to refrain from taking punitive actions against the Sinhalese mob. But in 
Parliament, Bandaranaike complained in the officer’s presence that his subordinates had failed to maintain 
law and order (D. Jeyaraj, 2007; Wilson, 2000).  
  
 
16
beginning or if he simply became a victim of the forces he unleashed and exploited, i.e. 
Sinhalese Buddhist patriotism. Regardless, the result was undue hardship for the Tamils.  
 
1.4 The Emergence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam  
 
 Much has been written about the LTTE and its impact on Sri Lankan politics.  
Consequently, this section will only provide a cursory introduction to LTTE’s origins and 
its claim to represent all the Tamil people of Sri Lanka (Subes, 2002). The 1970s saw an 
increase in poverty and unemployment throughout the country. In 1970, plans by the Sri 
Lankan government to limit the access of Tamil students to university fostered the birth 
of a Tamil militant student body named “The Tamil Students Movement” (South Asia 
Terrorism Portal, 2001a). When a new constitution was proclaimed in 1972 and the 
country was re-named Sri Lanka, the Tamil Students Movement splintered into two new 
militarized entities called the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) and the Tamil Eelam Liberation 
Organization (TELO) ("Former Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka," 2005; South Asia 
Terrorism Portal, 2001a). In 1972, the government introduced two regulations that further 
contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. 
One of these regulations formally established two different systems of standardization of 
grades for admission to university. In effect, Tamil students were required to achieve 
higher aggregate scores than Sinhalese students on entrance examinations to be accepted 
to the country’s universities (De Votta, 2007; "Sri Lanka-Post Colonial History," 2007).  
The protection and the fostering of Buddhism, which the state placed ahead of all of Sri 
Lanka’s religions, was the second regulation that contributed to a new phase of 
communal antagonism on the island (De Silva, 2005).   
Feeling like second-class citizens, the Tamil community, which included the 
Federal Party (FP), the Tamil Congress, and other Tamil organizations, reacted 
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collectively against the new constitution. As a result of their union, a new political party 
was created in 1972, which called itself the Tamil United Front (TUF) ("Sri Lanka-Post 
Colonial History," 2007; Wilson, 2000). At around the same time, the party, which was 
later renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front, raised its demand for a separate Tamil 
state in the north and in the east of Sri Lanka called “Tamil Eelam” (Perera, 1999). Tamil 
youth, who were members of the TNT, started to dominate Tamil politics and opted for a 
more militant approach. Their stance was inflamed in January 1974 when, during a key 
event in Jaffna called the World Tamil Research Conference, a peaceful Tamil crowd 
spilled onto the street and was attacked by the police who considered the gathering an 
unlawful assembly. The assault led to nine demonstrators being killed and dozens injured 
(Matthews, 1986).  
The attack also astounded the population which, until then, never feared the 
authorities (Matthews, 1986). As a result of this incident and other discriminatory acts 
perpetrated against the Tamil people by the government, tensions developed between 
Tamil leaders who wanted a separate nation and those who did not. This led to a series of 
political assassinations against those Tamil leaders who did not favor separation and 
preferred non-violent means of solving their ethnicity issues with the Sinhalese (Herath, 
2002). The first criminal act committed by the youth militant group TNT was the 
assassination in 1975 of the mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiyappah, who they perceived to 
be a Sinhalese collaborator (Berthier, 2006; Matthews, 1986).9   
By 1976, the TNT had become the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and with its 
new name, a new era of radicalism was born (Matthews, 1986). In order to fund and 
further develop his armed group, LTTE leader Prabhakaran and his associates resorted to 
                                                 
9 This assassination was plotted by four TNT youth, three of whom were later captured by the police. 
Legend claims that a fourth member, Velupillai Prabhakaran, got away. He later became the leader of the 
LTTE (Berthier, 2006; Wilson, 2000). 
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robbing banks (Kaihla, 1996; Sabaratnam, 2003b). In 1979, the government introduced a 
new draconian law, the Prevention of Terrorism Act. This law allowed the Sri Lankan 
security forces to arrest, imprison, and leave incommunicado for 18 months anyone 
suspected of having committed an unlawful act (De Votta, 2000).10 The Act, which was 
retroactive, led to many human rights abuses against young Tamils which fueled their 
sense of alienation towards the government (De Votta, 2000). In 1983, the government 
introduced the sixth amendment to the Constitution prohibiting anyone who advocated 
separatism from sitting in Parliament (Matthews, 1986). This measure was a blow to 
moderate Tamil leaders who were forced to resign their seats. The departure of all 14 
members of the TULF left Ceylon Tamils of the north leaderless and enabled the LTTE 
to take political control (Matthews, 1986). 
    
1.5 Mass Exodus: Canada Welcomes Tamils 
 
 As mentioned above, many political events of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
exacerbated the sense of alienation of the Tamil people from the Sri Lankan government. 
One notable act that further fueled Tamil distrust towards the Sri Lankan authorities was 
the 1981 burning of the Tamil public library in Jaffna, alleged to have been perpetrated 
by pro-government forces (De Votta, 1998). In the Jaffna library fire, an estimated 
90,000 rare Tamil volumes and manuscripts were destroyed (Herath, 2002). On the night 
of July 23, 1983, an island-wide outbreak of racial violence erupted after an LTTE 
garrison ambushed a Sinhalese army patrol near Jaffna. This ambush resulted in the death 
of 13 soldiers (Matthews, 1986; Senewiratne, 2006). Although the Armed Forces 
                                                 
10 An “unlawful activity” as per the Prevention of Terrorism Act meant any action taken or act committed 
by any means whatsoever, whether within or outside Sri Lanka, in the commission or in connection with 
the commission of any offences under the Act (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001b).  
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retaliated, communal riots against Tamils living in the south erupted ("Looters shot dead 
as rampage erupt in Sri Lanka city," 1983). The riots were alleged to have killed more 
than 4,000 Tamils and caused many more to seek asylum overseas (De Votta, 1998; 
Herath, 2002; Senewiratne, 2006). Against this background of violence, most TULF 
leaders fled Sri Lanka, leaving their people without any democratic leadership and at the 
mercy of the LTTE (Matthews, 1986).    
 Although the mass exodus of Tamil people began as a result of the anti-Tamil 
pogrom of 1983, the forced migration of Tamils is believed to date back to the late 1950s, 
when deteriorating relations with the Sinhalese people resulted in smaller-scale 
communal riots ("Ceylon Placed Under Curfew After 18 Slain," 1958; Sriskandarajah, 
2004). Coincidentally, Tamil immigration to Canada is believed to have started around 
the same period with predominantly English-educated Tamils coming from India’s upper-
middle and middle classes (Vaitheespara, 2007). In the early 1960s, the number of Tamil 
immigrants living in Canada from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu and from Sri Lanka 
(Ceylon) was estimated to be less than a few hundred individuals ("Immigration 
Statistics," 1966; Vaitheespara, 2007). By the late 1960s, the number of ethnic Tamils 
gradually increased after the introduction of Canada’s point system for skilled workers 
and with the sponsorship allowance of family members ("Historical highlights," 2006; 
Vaitheespara, 2007). However, the number of Tamils from Sri Lanka remained relatively 
low until the early 1980s with a population of approximately 3,000 individuals 
("Immigration Statistics," 1973; Ponnambalam, 1983; Vaitheespara, 2007).  
Following the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom, Canada changed its immigration policy 
and allowed Tamil ethnics to seek refuge under humanitarian and compassionate grounds 
(Sriskandarajah, 2004). From this moment, a steady flow of newcomers resulted in the 
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number of Tamils living in Canada to increase exponentially ("Canada's ethnocultural 
portrait: The changing mosaic," 2001; Foster, 2007). Although the number of Sri Lankan 
Tamils varies substantially from one official source to another, their total in Canada is 
estimated to be over 200,000 individuals (Foster, 2007; "Sri Lankan Tamil Migration," 
2007; Statistics Canada, 2007).11   
It is important to note that the change in Canada’s admission policy towards the 
Sri Lankan Tamils enabled a wider cross-section of immigrants resulting in newcomers 
being generally less anglicized and more infused with a sense of Tamil nationalism than 
their predecessors (Foster, 2007; Vaitheespara, 2007). Although there is nothing wrong 
with Tamil people having strong nationalist sentiments, especially after the turmoil many 
experienced while living in Sri Lanka, the ease of getting welfare and obtaining refugee 
status in the 1990s may have enticed many patriotic LTTE proponents to sneak in among 
the growing Canadian Tamil community (Cartier, Balfour, Bontempo, & Bontempo, 
1998; Proctor, 1997; Watson & Brazao, 1991). 
 
1.6 Canada: A New Source of Fund Raising for the LTTE  
As early as 1991, police detectives in the Toronto area were concerned that 
elements of the LTTE had entered Canada as refugee claimants and had blended among 
the general Tamil population (Watson & Brazao, 1991). These LTTE operatives were 
believed to be involved in criminal activities, such as the selling of falsified passports, 
trafficking in narcotics, and extorting Tamil nationals. All of these acts were allegedly 
                                                 
11 Statistics Canada 2006 Census recorded 122,020 Tamil-speaking individuals living in Canada. However, 
their actual number is believed to be higher as many Tamils speak neither of the official languages and thus 
may not have participated in the Census. 
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aimed at raising funds for the war in Sri Lanka (Oziewicz, 1998; "R. v. Satkunananthan," 
2001; "Suresh v. Canada," 1998; Watson & Brazao, 1991).   
However, it was not long before Canada’s security and law enforcement agencies 
realized that the continuing activities of the LTTE could place the country in a precarious 
position vis-à-vis other nations, such as the United States, who might consider Canada a 
haven for terrorist fundraising (Berlau, 2002; "Canada could be aiding terrorism, CSIS 
warns," 2000; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 1998). As a result of local and 
international pressures, Canada listed the LTTE as a terrorist entity on April 8, 2006 
(Public Safety Canada, 2006). 
 
1.7 Nationalism and its Nexus to Terrorism  
 Nationalism is a modern concept developed in the 18th century that can be 
described as an individual’s loyalty or devotion to a nation-state which surpasses other 
individual or group interests (Nationalism, 2009). In other words, nationalism is a 
sentiment that arises from a person’s personal attachment to their native soil, language, 
culture, traditions, values, and beliefs (Nationalism, 2009). Feelings of nationalism can 
also be reinforced through man-made trauma, such as the collective memory of an act 
that once affected the person’s ancestors (Lefebvre, 2003). To illustrate this in the context 
of the Sri Lankan Tamils, it could be argued that the Official Language Act of 1956 was 
considered by many Tamils as a direct attack on their nationhood (Byman, 1998).  
 Nationalism can also manifest itself in any activity that upholds the maintaining 
of identity, unity, and autonomy of a nation (Pamir, 1997). For example, as mentioned 
above, the peaceful demonstration “Satyagraha” of Tamils against the passing of the 
discriminatory Official Language Act, could, under this definition, be considered an act 
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of nationalism. When prejudice crosses political or cultural lines, it can cause immense 
outrage among the persecuted and lead a portion of that population to engage in ethno-
nationalist terrorism (Byman, 1998). Ethno-nationalist terrorism can be defined as 
intentional violence carried out by the dissident segment to further its cause (Byman, 
1998). To achieve success, the segment will depend on the assistance of organizations or 
countrymen who support their cause (Lefebvre, 2003). However, a struggle for authority 
within the same ethnic group will often lead to the elimination of internal dissent 
(Lefebvre, 2003). An example that illustrates this is the branding of people as traitors and 
the subsequent killing by the LTTE of many Tamils who considered engaging in 
negotiations with the Sinhalese government (Byman, 1998). Most importantly, ethno-
nationalist terrorists attempt to achieve communal identity through terrorist activities 
which have two critical outcomes. First, terrorism creates common bonds among 
members and supporters as a result of government retribution. Second, the oppression 
that ensues brings recognition to the terrorists’ cause among the larger population, thus 
potentially increasing membership and financial support (Byman, 1998). For example, 
through their violence against the Sinhalese regime, LTTE militants have given 
intellectuals and Tamils in general a greater sense of respectability and national identity, 
thus reducing their perceived subordination to the Sinhalese government (Byman, 1998). 
Alas, oppression by the state and the retaliating violence created by the LTTE lead all 
sides to view each other as enemies (Byman, 1998). In Chapter Four, the link between 
nationalism and terrorism will be further explored and analyzed through data collected 
for the survey.    
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1.8 Chapter Summary 
History has played an important role in bringing together the various elements 
that contributed to the inception and development of Tamil nationalism and the rise of the 
LTTE. The process began with the failure of the British colonial administration to 
recognize that historic hostilities between Tamils and Sinhalese could be revived if a 
parliamentary balance was not struck by the time Ceylon became independent.   
With the ascension of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike to power in 1956, and the 
subsequent passage of the Official Language Act, Sri Lanka entered into an era of racial 
tension and turmoil that it still has not recovered from. From that turmoil, the LTTE 
emerged and was able to grow into a powerful political force. As the civil war escalated 
and hundreds of thousands of Tamils fled to Canada, the LTTE sought an opportunity to 
infiltrate the Canadian Tamil Diaspora and use its nationals to further fund the war at 
home. 
The terror attacks of 9/11 imposed increased pressure on Canada to meet its 
international obligations to combat terrorism and its financing. As a result, the LTTE 
became a center of attention of Canada’s national security and policing agencies. In the 
next chapter, an explanation of the term terrorist financing and its relationship to money 
laundering techniques will be examined. Canada’s international commitments towards 
the suppression of terrorist financing in general will also be analyzed. In addition, 
Canada’s first terrorist financing case involving LTTE operations in Montreal and 
Toronto will be discussed.     
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Chapter Two: Terrorist Financing: A Methodical 
Approach   
 
2.0 Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Although much has been written about terror financing, the concept is not always 
understood. There appears to be a degree of confusion between terrorist financing12 and 
money laundering, albeit these terms often appear together. However, it is important to 
remember that disguising the destination of terrorist financing, whether the funds 
originate from a legitimate source or not, is paramount (Schmidt, 2009). Before 
reviewing Canada’s terrorist financing laws, a brief explanation of the terms money 
laundering and terrorist financing will be provided and a link between the two terms will 
be emphasized. 
Money laundering and terrorist financing often have similar features, mostly 
having to do with concealment and disguise (Schott, 2004). One definition of money 
laundering, adopted by Canada and many other countries, is found on the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF)’s website (Schott, 2004).13 Because the goal of many criminal 
acts is to generate profits for the individuals or groups that commit them, people involved 
in those crimes want to distance themselves as much as possible from the origin of their 
ill-gotten gains to avoid prosecutions and/or seizure (Schott, 2004). Money laundering is, 
                                                 
12 Please note that some authors also use the term “terrorism financing”. However, for the purpose of this 
major paper, the term “terrorist financing” will be used as referred to by the Integrated Threat Assessment 
Centre of Canada (ITAC). 
13 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the 
development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing. The FATF is, therefore, a "policy-making body" created in 1989 to generate the necessary 
political will to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas. The FATF has published 
40 recommendations that deal with money laundering and, in addition, promulgated nine recommendations 
that specifically address the financing of terrorism. The FATF, to which Canada is a member, is currently 
made up of 32 countries and territories, along with two regional organizations.   
Ref: http://www.fatf-gafi.org 
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the processes used by these individuals or groups to disassociate themselves from the 
illegal origins of those proceeds (FATF, 2007). Given this, it is necessary for offenders 
to: (1) erase the link between the crime and the profits; (2) erase the link between the 
profits and its new owner; and (3) protect the profits from possible confiscation (Thony, 
2000). As a result, money laundering is divided into three stages; (1) Placement; (2) 
Layering; and (3) Integration. The “Placement” phase involves the introduction of the 
launderer’s illegal profits into the financial system (FATF, 2007). This can be 
accomplished by either breaking up large amounts of money into smaller sums that are 
deposited into a bank account or by purchasing a series of monetary instruments, such as 
cheques, money orders, or investment securities in bearers form, that are collected and 
deposited into several accounts at various locations (FATF, 2007). The next phase, 
“Layering”, requires the launderer to convert or move the funds, often blending them 
with legally produced funds, to obfuscate their source (Schmidt, 2009). For example, the 
funds may be channeled through the purchase and sales of investments, such as precious 
metals, or securities (FATF, 2007). Alternatively, the launderer might simply wire the 
funds through a series of accounts at various banks located around the world. Finally, in 
the third phase, “Integration”, the launderer will re-introduce the funds into the legitimate 
economy after having processed the criminal profits through the first two stages. In this 
phase, the launderer uses the funds to, for example, purchase luxury assets, invest into 
business ventures, or purchase real estate (FATF, 2007).      
 By way of contrast, terrorist financing is concerned with the funding of activities,  
such as the recruitment of terrorists, the establishment and maintenance of training 
camps, the housing of terrorists, the purchase of conventional or unconventional 
weapons, the purchase of food and miscellaneous equipment, or the acquisition of 
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explosives (Ehrenfeld, 2005). In other words, it is the use of funds for all aspects of 
engaging in terrorism. Of note, funds used for the financing of terrorism can be of 
legitimate or illicit origin. This is one of the ways that it differs from money laundering 
(Gardner, 2007; Schott, 2004). Because of this critical difference, money laundering 
models are not sufficient for understanding the terrorist financing process. For terrorism, 
a model encompassing five stages was conceived and developed by terrorist financing 
expert John Schmidt.14 Schmidt’s model is referred as the Terrorist Financing/Resourcing 
model15 and its five stages are: (1) Acquisition; (2) Aggregation; (3) Transmission to the 
Terrorist Organization; (4) Transmission to the Operational Cell; and (5) Conversion 
(Schmidt, 2008a). 
 The “Acquisition” stage consists of the initial movement of funds and/or goods 
into the terrorist financing process (Schmidt, 2008a). These can be from legitimate or 
illegal sources. For example, in this phase, donations to legitimate or assumed charities, 
contributions by government agencies to terrorist organizations or their proxies,16 drug 
trafficking, human smuggling, or extortion from expatriates may take place (Schmidt, 
2008b). Furthermore, the “Acquisition” stage can involve the receipt or theft of goods 
meant to be exchanged for funds or other goods, including end-use goods, such as 
weapons, explosives, or food (Schmidt, 2008b). The second stage, the “Aggregation”, 
consists of the pooling of smaller funds or goods into larger ones. This stage normally 
                                                 
14 John Schmidt is a Senior Financial Intelligence Analyst with FINTRAC. At the time of this writing, Mr. 
Schmidt was seconded to the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), a Government of Canada 
agency tasked with the completion of threat assessments of terrorist threats to Canada and Canadian 
interests. Mr. Schmidt has lectured on terrorist financing/resourcing in Canada and abroad.  
15 As per John Schmidt’s model, the term “terrorist resourcing” is more accurate than the term “terrorist 
financing”. The objective of terrorist resourcing, which incorporates financing, is to provide end-use 
resources to terrorists and their supporters. Since money need not to be involved and is considered only one 
of a number of channels for moving exchangeable value, the term “terrorist resourcing” is preferred 
(Schmidt, 2008b). 
16 The author is aware of cases where individuals, whose links to terrorist organizations were initially 
unbeknownst to the government, applied for and received government business funding. 
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follows the “Acquisition”, although the Terrorist Resourcing model allows for stages to 
be bypassed if it suits the needs of the terrorist organization (Schmidt, 2008b). An 
example of “Aggregation” would be the transactions of money obtained from fundraising 
events held in different cities by the terrorist organization, which money would be 
funneled into one or several bank accounts located locally and/or overseas. In the third 
stage, the “Transmission to the Terrorist Organization”, the aggregated funds or goods 
are moved into the full control of the central terrorist group or to someone acting on its 
behalf (Schmidt, 2008b). This can be accomplished through a variety of unsophisticated 
to very sophisticated steps. For instance, cash couriers, wire transfers, or Hawalas17 can 
be used to bring funds or goods into the control of the terrorist organization. As in the 
previous stage, this step can also be bypassed (Schmidt, 2008b). The fourth stage, the  
“Transmission to the Operational Cell”, involves the allocation and delivery of funds or 
goods to the people who will ultimately use them to carry out organizational goals 
(Schmidt, 2008a). This stage may use the same transmission mechanism as in the 
previous phase, although funds channeled may be in smaller amounts and goods would 
be generally employed as end-use goods (Schmidt, 2008a). In the fifth stage, 
“Conversion”, the funds or goods are exchanged into services and end-use goods to 
support terrorist or related activities, including shelter, food, travel, recruitment, weapons, 
and training (Schmidt, 2008a). Figure 2 represents the five stages of the Terrorist 
Resourcing model and illustrates the various possibilities associated with the process. As 
noted, the path to the operational cell or end-use goods can vary according to specific 
need. The many variations provided by the Terrorist Resourcing model are one aspect 
                                                 
17 Hawala is a term that refers to an informal value transfer system whereby people can transfer money 
from one country to another without going through formal financial channels (Sharma, 2006). 
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that clearly sets it apart from the money laundering matrix where the three stages, 
generally speaking, must be followed in a particular order.18          
Figure 2: Some Variations in the Terrorist Resourcing Model19  
 
 
                      
As a note, Example 4 demonstrates that end-use goods or services can be acquired 
directly by those who will use them (see Figure 2). This could take the form of a theft of 
motor vehicle that would be used in a suicide bombing attack or, alternatively, it could be 
the provision of food, shelter, and other goods by local villagers to a terrorist cell 
(Schmidt, 2008a, 2009). In conclusion, although there are similarities between money 
laundering and terrorist financing, the latter is not a mere extension of the former. The 
Terrorist Resourcing model created by John Schmidt provides a better understanding of 
the intricacies and differences between the two.   
   
                                                 
18 In situations where funds have been obtained from fraudulent activities and are already in the financial 
system, the placement stage may be bypassed (Schmidt, 2009). 
19 Terrorism Resourcing diagram adapted with permission of John Schmidt. 
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2.1 Canada’s Terrorist Financing Laws 
Canada’s adoption of terrorist financing laws, including all of its anti-terrorism 
legislation, had much to do with its international obligations resulting from UN Treaties 
(Department of Justice Canada, 2007). For example, the endorsement of terrorist 
financing laws has its roots in the 1999 United Nations’ International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Financing (Department of Justice Canada, 2007). However, up 
until the events of 9/11, Canada had still not ratified that Convention, but was a signatory. 
On September 28, 2001, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1373 which required 
all UN Member states to implement measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, 
including the financing of terrorism (United Nations, 2001). Then, in October 2001, the 
FATF adopted eight Special Recommendations,20 one of which urged member states to 
immediately ratify both the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the United Nations Resolution 1373 
(Department of Justice Canada, 2007; FINTRAC, 2007; United Nations, 2001). Being a 
member of the United Nations and the FATF, Canada complied by passing Bill C-36, 
The Anti-Terrorism Act, which came into effect on December 18, 2001 (Hubbard, 
Murphy, ODonell, & DeFreitas, 2004).  
The terrorist financing offences introduced by this Act are found under Part II.1 of 
the Criminal Code, and consist of: Sections 83.02; 83.03; and 83.04. These sections, 
which may be considered broad in terms of the types of conduct they cover, address 
                                                 
20 The FATF, having recognized the primary importance of taking action to combat the financing of terrorism, 
adopted eight Special Recommendations that specifically addressed the financing of terrorism. These 
Recommendations (nine Recommendations as of 2004), when combined with the FATF 40 Recommendations on 
money laundering, set out the basic framework to detect, prevent, and suppress the financing of terrorism and 
terrorist acts (FINTRAC, 2007). See also the FATF 40 Recommendations on money laundering  http://www fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/42/43/33628117.PDF 
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primarily the providing, collecting, using, and making available of funds or property to 
carry out a terrorist activity21 or to benefit a terrorist group.22    
 
2.1.1: Section 83.02 Criminal Code: Providing or Collecting Property 
 
 Section 83.02 C.C reads as follows:  
83.02  Every one who, directly or indirectly, willfully and without lawful justification or excuse, 
provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in 
order to carry out 
(a) an act or omission that constitutes an offence referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) to (ix) of the 
definition of “terrorist activity” in subsection 83.01(1), or 
(b) any other act or omission intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, if the purpose of that 
act or omission, by its nature or context, is to intimidate the public, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or refrain from doing any act, 
     is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years 
(Pocket Criminal Code, 2008). 
 
This section suggests that everyone who knowingly provides or collects property for a 
terrorist group or for the commission of a terrorist act in Canada or abroad, by virtue of 
Section 7(3.73)23 of the Criminal Code, commits an offence with a maximum sentence of 
10 years in prison (Hubbard et al., 2004; "Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee 
on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36," 2001). Although this section addresses the financing 
                                                 
21 The Criminal Code definition of terrorist activity is quite extensive. There are two components to the 
definition. The first one encompasses offences under the ten United Nations anti-terrorism conventions and 
protocols (i.e. the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft). All the conventions and 
protocols are enumerated on the FATF website at  
http://www fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en 32250379 32235720 1 1 1 1 1,00 html.   
The second component of the definition includes activities committed for political, religious, or ideological 
purposes that intentionally intimidate the public or compel a government to do or to refrain from doing any 
act, and are intended to kill, seriously harm, or endanger people, substantially damage property, or disrupt 
essential services. It should be noted that lawful protests, dissent, and work stoppages are protected rights 
under this section (Department of Justice Canada, 2007; Liu, 2006; Unkovic, 2006). 
22 A terrorist group means an entity that has as one of its purposes or activities the facilitating or carrying 
out a terrorist activity or is a listed entity (Pocket Criminal Code, 2008). 
23 The effect of Section 7(3.73) of the Criminal Code is to permit prosecution for offences committed under 
Section 83.02 of the Criminal Code, even if the acts that constitute the basis for the offence are committed 
outside of Canada. However, it should be mentioned that for the extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply, there 
has to be a nexus with Canada (Hubbard et al., 2004). In the example of the GPS and the night vision 
goggles, which this author provides here, if a Canadian citizen met with a Hezbollah representative on a 
plane bound for Beirut and provided him with the property, Section 7(3.73) of the Criminal Code would 
apply against the Canadian citizen and/or the Hezbollah representative. 
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of terrorism, the definition of the term property is broad enough to include money and 
other real and personal property (Pocket Criminal Code, 2008).24 It is interesting to note 
that the language of Section 83.02 (i.e. providing property) could also initiate criminal 
liability under other parts of the Act, such as participating in, facilitating, and instructing 
a terrorist activity (K. Davis, 2001).25 An example of an offence under Section 83.02 
would include someone purchasing night vision goggles and a GPS receiver and sending 
them to Hezbollah—a designated terrorist entity under Section 83.05 of the Criminal 
Code. (Public Safety Canada, 2007; Thompson & Turlej, 2003).  
    
2.1.2: Section 83.03 Criminal Code: Providing, Making Available 
Property or Services  
 
 Section 83.03 of the Criminal Code is concerned with “Providing, Making 
Available, Etc., Property or Services for Terrorist Purposes”. The section states:  
83.03  Every one who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, 
or makes available property or financial or other related services  
(a) intending that they be used, or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose 
of facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is 
facilitating or carrying out such an activity, or 
(b) knowing that, in whole or part, they will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group, 
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years (Pocket 
Criminal Code, 2008).  
 
                                                 
24 As per Section 2 of the Criminal Code, the definition of “property” includes: (a) real and personal 
property of every description and deeds and instruments relating to or evidencing the title or right to 
property, or giving a right to recover or receive money or goods; (b) property originally in the possession or 
under the control of any person, and any property into or for which it has been converted or exchanged and 
anything acquired at any time by the conversion or exchange; and (c) any postal card, postage stamp, or 
other stamp issued or prepared for issue under the authority of Parliament or the legislature of a province 
for the payment to the Crown or a corporate body of any fee, rate or duty, whether or not it is in the 
possession of the Crown or of any person (Pocket Criminal Code, 2008).  
25 It is beyond the scope of this major paper to examine every prosecuting offence under the Anti-Terrorism 
Act. However, the reader should be aware that the legislative language in some of the non-terrorist 
financing provisions (i.e. Participating, Sec 83.18; Instructing, Sec. 83.22) overlaps and is broad enough to 
capture many forms of financing of terrorism (K. Davis, 2001; Pocket Criminal Code, 2008).    
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 There appears to be a large degree of overlap between the activities listed in 
Section 83.02 and those in this section (Hubbard et al., 2004). However, what 
distinguishes the two sections is that Section 83.02 is more specific in terms of the 
terrorist activities it comprises: Section 83.03 embraces a more extensive application 
(Hubbard et al., 2004). For example, Section 83.03 criminalizes the provision of 
“financial” or other related services, intending or knowing that they would be used to 
facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity (Roach, 2002). Furthermore, this section makes it 
a crime for anyone to benefit from the facilitation or the carrying out of a terrorist activity 
and applies to those individuals who know that property or a financial service “will be 
used or will benefit a terrorist group”(Pocket Criminal Code, 2008; Roach, 2002). 
 Similar to Section 83.02, this section also has an extraterritorial jurisdictional 
reach by virtue of Section 7(3.74) C.C., which permits individuals who are Canadian 
citizens or residents of Canada to be charged with offences taking place outside of 
Canada (Hubbard et al., 2004; Pocket Criminal Code, 2008). Examples of offences under 
this section would include someone fundraising for the LTTE or someone wiring funds to 
a bank in Pakistan knowing that the funds were intended for Al Qaeda (Thompson & 
Turlej, 2003). Another example would be someone directly or indirectly renting a house 
or inviting a person to rent a house knowing that the property will be used by, or will 
benefit, a terrorist group (Roach, 2002). 
  
2.1.3: Section 83.04 Criminal Code: Using or Possessing Property for 
Terrorist Purposes 
 
 Section 83.04 makes it an offence to use property for the purpose of carrying out a 
terrorist activity or possessing property intending or knowing that it will be used for such 
a purpose (Roach, 2002). To this extent, the section states:  
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83.04  Every one who  
(a) uses property, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying 
out a terrorist activity, or 
(b) possesses property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, directly or indirectly, in 
whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity, 
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years (Pocket 
Criminal Code, 2008). 
 
This section is designed to criminalize the use of property that aids terrorism (Hubbard et 
al., 2004). However, this section is somewhat ambiguous as it encompasses a wide range 
of acts (K. Davis, 2001; Hubbard et al., 2004). For instance, the prosecution is not 
required to demonstrate that an accused has committed any overt act in order to give 
effect to the illicit intention (K. Davis, 2001). In other words, the Crown would only need 
to establish that an accused had retained possession of the property as opposed to 
providing it, collecting it, or using it (K. Davis, 2001). Therefore, under this section, an 
accused would be committing an offence even if he possessed the property before 
forming the prohibited intention. Similar to Section 83.03, this provision includes 
extraterritorial jurisdictional provisions under Section 7(3.74) C.C. An example of an 
offence that would come under Section 83.04 might be individuals holding Molotov 
cocktails in their backpacks for someone else to throw at the police during a protest 
organized by a terrorist group or a listed entity (Thompson & Turlej, 2003).   
 In summary, the Anti-Terrorism Act portion of the Criminal Code encompasses 
Sections 83.02, 83.03, and 83.04, which provide a wide-range of measures that address 
offences related to providing, collecting, using, and making available funds or property to 
carry out terrorist activities or to benefit terrorist groups. One of the organizations long 
suspected of using Canada as a location and source of terror fundraising has been the 
LTTE. This organization is the focus of the next section. 
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2.2 The Role and Structure of the LTTE in Canada 
 
It is estimated that Canada is home to the largest Tamil Diaspora in the world 
(Becker, 2004). Given this, the LTTE has relied heavily on this population to raise 
money. These funds have enabled the LTTE to purchase weapons, diversify its 
organizational structure, and extend its campaign against the government of Sri Lanka 
(Jane's Intelligence Review, 2007; Romanick, 2006). 
In order to combat the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, the LTTE developed a well-
organized, two-tier structure, similar to many professional armies (Chalk, 1999). For 
example, the LTTE created divisions, such as the Sea Tigers, the Air Tigers, the Black 
Tigers, a specialized intelligence unit, the Charles Anthony Regiment which is an elite 
fighting armed forces, and a political wing named the Peace Secretariat of the LTTE.26  
This organizational structure made the LTTE one of the most sophisticated insurgencies 
in the world (Chalk, 1999; Fair, 2004; Romanick, 2006; The Mackenzie Institute, 2000). 
In 2007, it was estimated that the LTTE’s worldwide fundraising activities generated 
between USD $200 to $300 million per year (Jane's Intelligence Review, 2007). In 
Canada, the LTTE is believed to be behind many operations that include legitimate 
businesses funded with LTTE money (Jayasekara, 2007). According to the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), in 2006, these businesses provided at least $2 
million a year (Romanick, 2006). 
                                                 
26 The Sea Tigers are the naval wing of the LTTE. This naval firepower mainly consists of lightweight 
boats. The Air Tigers are its airborne group. This airborne regiment consists of several lightweight aircrafts 
and is known to be the world’s first air force controlled by an organization proscribed as terrorist. The 
Black Tigers are the suicide commando unit. The Black Tigers, which include women, are responsible for 
large-scale bomb attacks and the assassination of many political leaders (Athas, 2006; Chalk, 1999; Jane's 
Intelligence Review, 2007). 
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For example, the World Tamil Movement (WTM), raided by the RCMP in April 
2006, is believed to be a conduit for the LTTE (Bell, 2006d; Jeyaraj, 1996).27 With 
Canada suspected of being one of the principal overseas support bases for the LTTE, 
measures have to be taken by the government to disrupt the flow of funds originating 
from its Tamil Diaspora. However, it is critical to keep in mind that, although many 
Canadian Tamils might ideologically support the LTTE’s goal of an independent Tamil 
state, they do not necessarily endorse the means or approach that the LTTE have adopted 
to reach their objective. 
It is difficult not to sympathize with the plight of the Tamils, especially with 
reports claiming that the Sri Lankan government is responsible for the extra-judicial 
killings of young Tamil males, the continuous misery of thousands of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDP’s), the torture of Tamil prisoners by police and military forces, 
and the blatant use of Tamil and Muslim land by the government to establish security 
zones and Buddhist shrines in areas prominently non-Buddhist (Ganesh, 2008; U.S. 
Department of State, 2008). More troubling is the government’s artillery fire and aerial 
bombings of Tamil populated areas.28 It is therefore no surprise that many Tamils support 
the LTTE, given the Sri Lankan government’s continuous decline for the respect of 
human rights (U.S. Department of State, 2008). Even representatives of the international 
community recognized the basis for the Tamil’s plight. For example, the British High 
Commissioner (HC), Dominick Chilcott, during a lecture in Colombo in December 2007, 
stated that there was nothing illegitimate about the aspiration for a Tamil Eelam 
(independent Tamil state), but that the LTTE’s methods to achieve it were simply 
                                                 
27 As early as 1996, Canadian Tamil journalist David Jeyaraj was writing in Canadian Tamil newspapers 
about the WTM being a front for the LTTE. 
28 It should be noted that as recent as April 2009, there were reports of the government shelling Tamil 
civilian populations. These civilians were held against their will by the LTTE who used them as human 
shields (Mallawarachi & Engeler, 2009).   
  
 
36
unacceptable ("Eelam is Not Illegitimate, but LTTE Methods are Unacceptable: British 
High Commissioner," 2007). Ironically, HC Chilcott’s speech brought about antagonism 
from both sides of the conflict as some Tamil critics suggested that legitimate means to 
Eelam were prohibited under the Sri Lankan Constitution.29 For their part, Sinhalese 
government officials expressed deep concerns about HC Chilcott’s ostensible blessing for 
a separate state within Sri Lanka ("Lanka to express deep displeasure over Chilcott 
statement - Foreign Minister," 2007).   
However, it seems that a Tamil Eelam may come at an expensive price. For 
example, it is alleged that many Canadian Tamils have been victims of LTTE 
intimidation and extortion (Becker, 2006). Obviously, not all Canadian Tamils are subject 
to these types of tactics as some may be at least ideologically supportive of the LTTE’s 
goal and may not be opposed to contributing financially to its cause ("Sri Lanka: Human 
Rights Watch Replies to the Canadian Tamil Congress," 2006). Although it is extremely 
difficult to estimate the proportion of community members within the Canadian Tamil 
Diaspora subjected to LTTE pressure tactics and coercion, likely as a result of their 
                                                 
29 The 6th Amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution, passed on August 8, 1983, stipulates in its Article 
157A that: (1) No person shall, directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote, 
finance, encourage, or advocate the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka;       
(2) No political party or other association or organization shall have as one of its aims or objects the 
establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka; (3) Any person who acts in 
contravention of the provisions of paragraph (1) shall, on conviction by the Court of Appeal, after trial on 
indictment and according to such procedure as may be prescribed by law, (a) be subject to civic disability 
for such period not exceeding seven years as may be determined by such Court; (b) forfeit his movable and 
immovable property other than such property as is determined by an order of such Court as being necessary 
for the sustenance of such person and his family; (c) not be entitled to civic rights for such period not 
exceeding seven years as may be determined by such Court; and (d) if he is a Member of Parliament or a 
person in such service or holding such office as is referred to in paragraph (1) of Article 165, cease to be 
such Member or to be in such service or to hold such office. ("The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka," 2007). 
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reluctance to approach Canadian authorities, it is clear that many are pressured into 
giving money to the LTTE (Becker, 2006; Bell, 2008b; Romanick, 2006).30  
The continued appeal exerted by the LTTE on the Canadian Tamil Diaspora has 
resulted in Canada becoming an “economic backbone” for the outlawed militant group 
(Fair, 2004). The large sum of money being raised by the LTTE puts Canada in a 
precarious situation with its FATF crime-fighting partners and puts in question Canada’s 
ability to effectively combat terrorist financing (FATF, 2008a). This was evidenced by 
National Post senior correspondent and leading national security journalist, Stewart Bell, 
contending that money raised in Canada by the LTTE was used to purchase explosives 
and carry out suicide attacks in Sri Lanka (Bell, 2004). In September 1993, funds totaling 
$990,987.00 were wired from a Vancouver HSBC bank account controlled by the LTTE 
to another LTTE bank account overseas (Bell, 2004). Eight months later, the LTTE’s 
chief arms buyer, Tharmalingam Shanmugham, alias Kumaran Pathmanathan or KP, 
used the Canadian money to arrange for an LTTE front company located in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, to purchase a total of 60 tons of explosives (Bell, 2004). The explosive 
shipment, composed of ten tons of RDX31 and 50 tons of TNT, was acquired from a 
chemical plant in the Ukraine (Bell, 2004; Chalk, 1999).32 Some of the explosives were 
subsequently used by the LTTE to perpetrate Oklahoma City-style attacks on civilians 
and infrastructures in Sri Lanka (Chalk, 1999; Turlej, 2000). One of the most notorious 
and deadly bomb attacks to ever take place in Sri Lanka occurred on January 31, 1996 
when a suicide bomber drove a truck laden with explosives into the Central Bank 
building in Colombo’s commercial district. In total, 91 people were killed and more than 
                                                 
30 This topic will be further discussed in Chapter Four. 
31 RDX stands for Royal Demolition eXplosive. RDX is a white powder widely used in military and 
industrial applications and is very explosive (ATSDR, 1996).  
32 Stewart Bell obtained his information from classified intelligence documents, interviews with terror 
victims, and from senior counterterrorist officials (Bell, 2004). 
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1,400 others were injured. In addition to causing widespread panic, the explosion resulted 
in severe damage to Colombo’s commercial district ("A terror attack in Colombo," 1996; 
The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2008). 
There are many reasons that may compel Tamils living in Canada to donate 
money to the LTTE. Unquestionably, many may be genuinely engaged in supporting an 
organization viewed as defending Tamils in the face of discrimination and human rights 
abuses perpetrated by the Sinhalese authorities (A. Davis, 1996). However, as 
demonstrated in the example of the HSBC money transfer, Canada cannot afford to 
remain passive and condone the financing of terrorism. If the war in Sri Lanka is to end 
in the foreseeable future, Canada has the implicit responsibility to disrupt LTTE 
fundraising and terrorist financing from within. This is a daunting task that will require 
several strategies to work together from the laying of criminal charges and seizure of 
assets against LTTE terrorist financiers to police organizations earning Tamil Diasporas’ 
trust. 
   
2.3 Case Studies: Project CRIBLE and Project OSALUKI 
 
Much has been written about terrorist financing. However, from a Canadian 
perspective, there has been very little research on the intricacies of how terrorist 
financing is actually carried out. Moreover, until recently, no one had been charged with 
a terrorist financing offence in Canada (Bell, 2008a; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
2008). 
In 2003, the LTTE became the subject of an Integrated National Security 
Enforcement Team (INSET) investigation after it was suspected of using various 
financial schemes in Canada to generate money to underwrite attacks in Sri Lanka (Bell, 
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2006b). What prompted the investigation into the activities of the LTTE was a probe 
conducted by the RCMP’s Financial Intelligence Branch, in 2002, using the Sleipner 
model (Bell, 2006a).33 This method identified the LTTE as a National Security strategic 
priority for the RCMP, meaning that the activities of the LTTE in Canada represented a 
potential threat to Canada, and sufficient grounds existed to warrant a criminal 
investigation (Bell, 2006a; Canada. Parliament. House of Commons, 2007). As a result, 
two parallel investigations, one in Montreal, Quebec, called “Project CRIBLE”, and one 
in Toronto, Ontario, named “Project OSALUKI”, were initiated simultaneously (Bell, 
2007). The two investigations, which focused on the activities of a Tamil organization 
named “The World Tamil Movement” (WTM), with offices in Canada and around the 
world, considered the organization a front syndicate collecting funds on behalf of the 
LTTE ("Sa Majeste La Reine c. World Tamil Movement," 2006; "Suresh v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)," 2003). The two projects went fairly 
unnoticed until April 8, 2006, when the Conservative government listed the LTTE as a 
terrorist group. Within days of the listing, WTM personnel in Montreal and Toronto tried 
to hide and relocate documents and LTTE propaganda from their offices ("Sa Majeste La 
Reine c. World Tamil Movement," 2006). These actions precipitated an expedient 
response from the RCMP, which raided four locations in Montreal between April 12-13, 
2006, and the Toronto WTM’s office in Scarborough, on April 22, 2006 (Bell, 2006b; 
Jane's Intelligence Review, 2007; "World Tamil Movement c. Canada (Attorney 
General)," 2007). The execution of the search warrants in Montreal and Toronto yielded 
incriminating documents and LTTE propaganda material, such as posters, calendars, 
monthly bank reports relating to pre-authorized payments credited to WTM accounts, 
                                                 
33 The Sleipner model is an analytical survey that helps determine whether the intelligence on a specific 
group is good and warrants further investigation (Canada. Parliament. House of Commons., 2004). 
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lists of donors, and even a voters list for the January 2006 federal election with Tamil 
names highlighted (Bell, 2006c; "Sa Majeste La Reine c. World Tamil Movement," 
2006). 
 At the time of the execution of the search warrants, the RCMP had worked for 
over two years gathering evidence that the WTM and other Tamil organizations, such as 
the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), had been collecting funds for the LTTE in 
order to purchase weapons and further the cause of an independent Tamil state. The 
Information to Obtain a Search Warrant (ITO), drafted in April 2006 by Montreal RCMP 
Corporal Denis Boudreau, outlined a very troubling, but sophisticated fundraising 
mechanism utilized by LTTE operatives in Canada. This method allowed the LTTE’s 
alleged arm, the WTM, to amass considerable sums of money from willing and unwilling 
Canadian Tamil Diaspora members (Boudreau, 2006). 
For instance, individual Tamil merchants in the Montreal area were requested to 
pay amounts anywhere from $1,000.00 to $3,000.00 per year to WTM representatives. 
This was in addition to other fundraising schemes promoted by the WTM, such as the 
“Tamil Saving Fund” in 2005, asking Tamil families, businesses, and prominent Tamil 
community members, to take personal loans ranging from $2,500.00 to $50,000.00 which 
were to be paid to the WTM. The ultimate goal of this one-time event fundraising 
activity, which the WTM pledged it would repay 10% by 2008, was to accumulate $100 
million by the end of June 2006 (Davermann, 2008). Given the amount of money that 
could potentially be raised as a result of a single fundraising event, it should come as no 
surprise that the LTTE was capable, through its worldwide businesses and fronts, to 
generate USD $200 million to $300 million per year ("USD 200 million profit margins 
maintain sophisticated Tamil Tiger war," 2007).   
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Another fundraising strategy of the WTM is door-to-door solicitation. The 
Montreal Tamil community, estimated at 25,000 individuals, has been regularly 
approached by WTM personnel, who use persistent means to convince Diaspora 
members to contribute financially to the LTTE. For example, some Tamil members have 
been pressured to sign monthly pledges to the WTM (Davermann, 2008). According to 
Corporal Boudreau’s ITO, people from the Tamil community are intimidated by WTM 
members to donate money ("Sa Majeste La Reine c. World Tamil Movement," 2006).    
One of the most clever and original fundraising methods employed by the LTTE 
has been the pre-authorized payment plan. To this end, Corporal Boudreau’s ITO 
disclosed that members of the Tamil community, who have returned to Sri Lanka to visit 
relatives, have been compelled to agree to finance LTTE efforts on a monthly basis. The 
pre-authorized payment scheme is perpetrated as follows: A Tamil Canadian travels to 
Sri Lanka to visit relatives. Prior to entering Tamil territory controlled by the LTTE, the 
Tamil traveler is stopped at a Sri Lankan army checkpoint, described as a routine customs 
check. Once through, and approximately one kilometer away from the Sri Lankan army, 
the traveler is stopped again, this time at an inspection point manned by LTTE operatives. 
The Tamil traveler is then asked to produce his Canadian passport, where the data is 
checked on a computer. Interestingly, even though this trip to LTTE-occupied area may 
be the first one that the traveler takes, much information is already known about the 
individual, such as their name, address, relatives in Sri Lanka, and the amount they have 
previously contributed in Canada towards the LTTE. If the LTTE data reveals that the 
traveler has not been a contributor, the individual is encouraged to make a monthly 
pledge, which may vary according to the length of time the traveler has lived abroad 
(Becker, 2006; Davermann, 2008). For instance, a typical monthly pre-authorized debit 
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pledge may range in the neighborhood of $30.00 per month. Once the traveler has signed 
the pre-authorized payment plan at the checkpoint, he is informed that WTM members in 
Canada will visit him in order to complete the payment process. The traveler is then 
given a pass, similar to a Visa, and permitted to continue on his journey into LTTE-
controlled territory. It should be mentioned that failure to agree to the monthly pledge 
could ultimately prevent the traveler from entering LTTE-controlled territory 
(Davermann, 2008). Upon returning to Canada, the traveler is contacted by a WTM 
member who produces a copy of the form the individual signed in Sri Lanka. The pre-
payment arrangement is then facilitated by the WTM member and monthly pledges begin 
to be automatically withdrawn from the payer’s account. The money is then directly 
deposited into a WTM account. WTM money is later funneled through formal payment 
systems to the LTTE International Secretariat located in Sri Lanka (Davermann, 2008).   
 The above scenario is typical of a Tamil Canadian visiting the LTTE-controlled 
territory of Sri Lanka (Davermann, 2008). However, a procedural difference exists if the 
individual is already participating in some form of financial support. For instance, some 
Tamil families in Europe have been issued a PIN number, associated to a Tamil Eelam 
identity number, which indicates that the family is contributing financially to the LTTE 
cause (Becker, 2006; "Not a feather in Tiger cap," 2007). This new method of 
fundraising, along with all the others already discussed, has enabled the LTTE to 
maintain its financial resources (Jane's Intelligence Review, 2007). 
LTTE fundraising activities in Canada, sponsored by organizations such as the 
WTM, brings an appearance of legitimacy (i.e. engaged in humanitarian activities or 
cultural events), which is needed in order to provide a legitimate front for the 
organization (Bell, 2008c; Jayasekara, 2007; U.S. Department of State, 2008). For 
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example, in August 2006, three Canadians of Tamil origin were among eight people 
arrested after the three traveled to New York in order to acquire military equipment for 
the LTTE (Federation of American Scientists, 2006). Some of the more sophisticated 
armaments to be purchased were sought in order to shoot down Sri Lankan Air Force 
fighter jets and destroy boats (United States Department of Justice, 2006). The deal, 
which would have cost the LTTE somewhere between USD $900,000.00 and 
$937,500.00, was allegedly facilitated by one of the Canadians and would have procured 
the LTTE with ten SA 18 surface-to-air missiles and 500 rifles (United States Department 
of Justice, 2006). Had this illicit sale of weapons not been stopped by authorities, 
subsequent negotiations for the purchase of an additional 50 to 100 surface-to-air 
missiles, costing in the millions, would have likely taken place (United States Department 
of Justice, 2006).34 Based on the literature reviewed for this paper, the funds raised in 
Canada by the WTM have directly contributed to the LTTE’s cause. Accusations that the 
WTM is a front for the LTTE continue to be vehemently denied by its Canadian 
president, Mr. Sithamparathan. During a Show Cause Hearing held in Quebec Provincial 
Court, in the City of Montreal in May 2007, Sithamparathan explained that the WTM, 
with an annual budget between $40,000.00 and $50,000.00, was the main organization 
representing the interests of the Tamil people. Sithamparathan added that the WTM 
offered community services, such as language classes in Tamil, French, English, 
promoted sporting activities for children, and provided computer classes ("Sa Majeste La 
Reine c. World Tamil Movement," 2007). During his examination-in-chief,35 
                                                 
34 On January 26, 2009, a Canadian Tamil, 29 years old Sathajhan Sarachandran, pleaded guilty to five 
counts of terrorism related charges in a New York court. Sarachandran had attempted to purchase SA 18 
heat-seeking missiles and AK-47 on behalf of the LTTE (Bell & Humphreys, 2009).  
35 An examination-in-chief is a legal term that relates to the questioning of a counsel’s own witness under 
oath. A witness is introduced to a trial through an examination-in-chief, which is when the witness answers 
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Sithamparathan was adamant that the search conducted by RCMP officers at the WTM’s 
office in Montreal in April 2006 had extremely negative consequences for his 
organization. Sithamparathan explained that the search of the WTM’s premise had caused 
seniors and children to stop coming to the WTM and also resulted in a reduction in the 
amount donated to the organization by the Tamil Diaspora ("Sa Majeste La Reine c. 
World Tamil Movement," 2007).     
On April 11, 2008, in an unprecedented move, both the Toronto and Montreal 
RCMP National Security teams inconspicuously restrained property belonging to the 
WTM, pursuant to Section 83.13 (1) of the Criminal Code (Bell & Hamilton, 2008; 
Davermann, 2008). In Montreal, the property frozen included the WTM headquarters, 
located on Van Horne Avenue, worth an estimated $352,500.00 in 2007, and its TD Bank 
account, where approximately $4,000.00 still remained (Davermann, 2008). Other 
exhibits detained by the police resulting from the 2006 search warrants were formally 
seized via an application for a Special Search Warrant.36    
In Toronto, the property restrained included two CIBC bank accounts, four TD 
bank accounts, and a host of paraphernalia, such as images of the LTTE leader, LTTE 
propaganda CDs, clocks, watches, cups, shirts, an even an image of the female LTTE 
suicide bomber responsible for the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi (Hill, 2008). The evidence that the police collected during its investigations into 
the activities of the WTM overwhelmingly linked it to the LTTE. 
                                                                                                                                                 
questions asked by the lawyer representing the party which called him/her to the stand ("Examination-in-
chief," 2008).  
36 In relation to proceeds of crime or offences related property, the term “restraint” is associated with the 
seizure of an intangible asset, something of value that cannot be physically touched or moved, such as a 
bank account or a residence. The term Special Search Warrant is associated with the “seizure” of tangible 
assets, such as a vehicle, furniture, or documents. The Anti-Terrorism Act introduced provisions that permit 
the subsequent forfeiture of property related to terrorist groups or terrorist activities that have been 
“restrained ” or “seized” under Section 83.13 of the Criminal Code (Hubbard et al., 2004; Pocket Criminal 
Code, 2008).   
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  One piece of evidence collected by police during the execution of a search 
warrant on a Montreal apartment was particularly damaging. This evidence, a document 
entitled Re-Organization of Foreign Branches of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 
explicitly outlined how the activities of the WTM (i.e. cultural events, language schools, 
computer classes, sporting events, and fundraisers) were to be set up to directly benefit 
the LTTE (Davermann, 2008; Jayasekara, 2007). The document, produced in 2003, 
explained the duties and activities of the Foreign Branches (i.e. WTM). In order to 
survive as an organization and attain its ultimate goal of an independent Tamil state, the 
LTTE heavily depends on contributions from Tamil Diasporas dispersed around the 
world (Davermann, 2008). As a result, the LTTE created sub-organizations that operated 
in each of those countries, which it called Foreign Branches. The Re-Organization of 
Foreign Branches of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam document, also called LTTE 
Operations Manual by the police, detailed four areas of activities that must be established 
by the Foreign Branches (Davermann, 2008). These were: (1) propaganda and media; (2) 
fundraising from the public; (3) the activities of auxiliary organizations; and (4) the 
Tamils’ welfare associations. 
 All the evidence collected by the police demonstrated that the Montreal and 
Toronto WTM offices financed the LTTE and operated in a manner that followed the 
guidelines enumerated in the organization’s Operations Manual. For instance, the WTM 
established contacts with politicians, promoted Martyrs Day events, printed LTTE 
propaganda, and organized sporting events to help raise funds for the LTTE (Davermann, 
2008; Hamilton & Bell, 2008a). As a result of its activities, police estimated that, since 
2001, the WTM Montreal office alone raised over $666,874.00 (Davermann, 2008; 
Hamilton & Bell, 2008b). Even though the police seizure case appeared very robust, 
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WTM’s lawyer Steven Slimovitch argued that the WTM was not involved in funding 
terrorism, as evidenced by the fact that no one has been criminally charged. Moreover, he 
maintained that the police should stop targeting the WTM (Bell & Hamilton, 2008). For 
his part, the president of the Toronto WTM, Mr. Sittampalam, vehemently denied the 
RCMP allegations that his group was a front for the LTTE (Grewal, 2008). 
   
2.4 Civil Forfeiture: How Can Assets Be Forfeited Without 
Charges?  
 
 As mentioned in the above section, both the Montreal and Toronto RCMP police 
seized and restrained WTM property as per Section 83.13(1) of the Criminal Code. That 
section allows the government to prepare for the forfeiture of assets seized and/or 
restrained based on “a balance of probabilities” that the evidence is tied to terrorism (Bell 
& Hamilton, 2008). This is a lower burden of proof than that of “beyond reasonable 
doubt” which is normally associated with someone charged with a criminal offence. The 
legal instrument used to forfeit assets on the balance of probabilities when no one is 
charged is called “civil forfeiture”. In this section, a very brief explanation of the concept 
behind civil forfeiture and its relationship to the cases at hand will be discussed.    
 Civil forfeiture of property is a legal proceeding against the property itself (also 
known as in rem proceeding). A civil forfeiture action requires the government to show 
by the civil standard of proof based on the balance of probabilities that the property 
violated the law. Whereas civil forfeiture is a proceeding against the property, criminal 
forfeiture is a proceeding against a person (also known as in personem proceeding) 
alleged to have committed a crime. The major differences between civil and criminal 
forfeiture proceedings can be summarized as: a civil forfeiture is not dependent on the 
initiation or successful completion of a criminal action against a defendant, whereas 
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criminal forfeiture is dependent on the conviction of the accused, and the Crown to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a person committed the offence (Richards, 1999).  
 Although the implementation of in rem forfeiture within the Criminal Code dates 
back to 2001, the concept is not new to Canada. Many Canadian federal statutes contain 
provisions that mandate the in rem forfeiture of property used in violation of the Acts 
(Hubbard et al., 2004). Some of these Statutes, such as the Customs Act, the Excise Act, 
and the Fisheries Act, can be traced back to just after the implementation of Canada's 
Constitution. 
 
2.4.1 Civil Forfeiture within the Anti-Terrorism Act 
  
 On December 18, 2001, some of the most rigorous sections ever introduced to the 
Criminal Code came into force with the proclamation of the Anti-Terrorism Act. This 
also meant that fully-fledged civil forfeiture provisions were now an integral part of the 
Criminal Code (Hubbard et al., 2004). The Anti-Terrorism Act was Canada’s response to 
the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and provided an expansion of powers to address 
the threats of terrorism (Hubbard et al., 2004). For example, Section 83.14 C.C. allows 
the Attorney General to make an application to a judge of the Federal Court for an order 
of forfeiture with regards to: a property owned or controlled by or on behalf of a terrorist 
group; or a property that has been or will be used, in whole or in part, to facilitate or carry 
out a terrorist activity.  
 Because the forfeiture application is presented in the Federal Court, someone need 
not be charged or convicted of a criminal offence in order for the property to be 
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forfeited.37 In the case of any property that falls under Section 83.14(1) C.C., such as the 
WTM’s office and its bank accounts, the Crown is only required to prove on a balance of 
probabilities that the property is terrorist-related. Once that is completed, the property is 
forfeited (Hubbard et al., 2004). A key question is whether this legislation is fair? The 
response can be found in the Anti-Terrorism Act itself as it provides an innocent owner’s 
or third-party clause that will prevent the property from forfeiture.  
 However, for that provision to be invoked, the owner or third-party must establish 
that he/she had been diligent in ensuring the property could not be used to facilitate or 
carry out terrorist activities (Hubbard et al., 2004). In the case of the WTM building, 
bank accounts, and LTTE paraphernalia restrained and/or seized, the evidence introduced 
by way of affidavits by the Toronto and Montreal National Security police strongly 
supported the belief that the WTM was an arm of the LTTE. Evidence that the owners of 
the Montreal WTM building were aware of the activities may make it difficult for them 
to use the innocent owner’s clause to stop the forfeiture of their property. 
 
                                                 
37 The Federal Court is Canada’s national trial court which hears and decides legal disputes arising in the 
federal domain that include claims against the Government of Canada, civil suits in federally-regulated 
areas, and challenges to the decisions of federal tribunals. With regards to Criminal Code applications 
permitting forfeiture of property, they are usually made to provincial superior courts after witnesses have 
testified. However, Section 83.14 of the Criminal Code specifically requires that applications for the 
forfeiture of terrorist property be made to the Federal Court. This requirement acknowledges that the 
application may not have anything to do with proof of criminal acts against individuals. In addition, 
hearsay affidavits are allowed and may provide the evidentiary basis for the forfeiture. Consequently, the 
forfeiture application is strictly in rem and solely aimed at the property of terrorists (Federal Court of 
Canada, 2008; Hubbard et al., 2004). 
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2.5 The Global Fight against Terrorist Financing: The 2008 FATF 
Evaluation of Canada 
 
 This major paper would not be complete without a cursory look into the 2007-
2008 FATF mutual evaluation of Canada. The evaluation, completed in February 2008, 
measured Canada’s anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regime and its 
compliance against the 40 + 9 FATF recommendations (FATF, 2008a). Canada has come 
a long way since its last mutual evaluation completed more than ten years ago. Hence, the 
most consequential developments have been the advent of the Proceeds of Crime (Money 
Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and the creation of the Financial Transactions 
Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, also known as FINTRAC (FATF, 2008b).38   
 Although it would be beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed 
examination of the FATF report, a section, notably that related to Canada’s three terrorist 
financing offences (ss.83.02-83.04, C.C.) warrant further discussion. Of particular 
interest is the critical outlook the report provides on the number of persons (only three) 
who have been charged with terrorist financing offences since the inception of the law in 
2001(FATF, 2008a). Because only one of these cases has gone to trial at the time of this 
writing, the FATF is concerned that the effectiveness of the terrorist financing regime is 
an issue that requires further attention from the authorities (FATF, 2008a).39  
 The FATF was also concerned with the low number of analytical work related to 
money laundering and terrorist financing that FINTRAC generates. Given its advanced 
                                                 
38 FINTRAC is a financial intelligence unit created in order to acquire, analyze, and disclose financial 
information and intelligence on suspected money laundering and terrorist financing activities to law 
enforcement agencies. The Centre, created in July 2000, is an integral part of Canada’s engagement in the 
global fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities (FINTRAC, 2008). 
39 On October 29, 2008, Mohammad Momin Khawaja became the first individual to be found guilty under 
the Anti-Terrorism Act. Among some of the charges, Khawaja was convicted of terrorist financing and 
facilitating a group of British Islamic extremists who were plotting to bomb London, England. On March 
12, 2009, Khawaja was sentenced to 10 ½ years imprisonment (Brennan, 2009; Duffy & MacLeod, 2008; 
Wark, 2008). 
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technology, law enforcement agencies should be in a position to better benefit from 
FINTRAC disclosures. However, this has not been the case. Unsatisfactory timelines for 
FINTRAC disclosures, which can take months, and the limited added value of the 
disclosures, have frustrated many law enforcement agencies (FATF, 2008a). For its part, 
FINTRAC called the criticism unfounded and unreflective of the "legal reality" in 
Canada (Montpetit, 2008). Although it is true that Canada’s “legal reality”, namely the 
Charter and privacy laws, impose severe operational restrictions upon FINTRAC, recent 
discussions this author had with proceeds of crime investigators seem to support that 
FINTRAC disclosures to law enforcement agencies have had limited added value.40    
 In summary, the report is quite critical of Canada’s compliance record with the 40 
+ 9 FATF Recommendations. For example, Canada has been identified as non-compliant 
on 11 recommendations and only partly compliant on another seven (FATF, 2008a). 
Canada’s terrorist financing strategy was also negatively commented upon. However, it is 
the author’s view that the efficacy of a strategy should not necessarily be judged on the 
number of people charged criminally, but on its success before the courts. In any event, 
this is an area to watch in the future.  
    
2.6 Chapter Summary 
  
 Although money laundering and terrorist financing concepts share some common 
techniques, terrorist financing is not a mere extension of the former. Because of the 
legitimate origin of some of its funds, terrorist financing can be more subtle and difficult 
                                                 
40 It would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the Canadian laws that affect FINTRAC’s ability to 
operate more efficiently. Suffice to say that the FATF report may trigger legislative reforms to improve 
FINTRAC’s operational restrictions. Please visit the FATF website at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/28/33/40196937.pdf for an executive summary of the report. With regards to the 
timeliness of FINTRAC disclosures to law enforcement agencies, a substantial improvement has been 
noted since March 2007 (FATF, 2008a). Lastly, the police officers approached by the author with regards 
to this section wished to remain anonymous. 
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to detect. As such, a better understanding of its process is necessary so that any of its 
various stages can be identified and reported to law enforcement agencies for further 
investigation.  
 Despite the fact that few individuals have been charged and/or convicted under 
Canada’s terrorist financing laws, a preliminary assessment of the legislation would seem 
to support the opinion that the laws are working. Even though no LTTE operative has 
been arrested for terrorism offences in relation to Project CRIBLE and Project 
OSALUKI, the legislative strategy through its civil forfeiture regime, has enabled 
Canadian authorities to disrupt some of the LTTE’s fundraising activities. There is no 
doubt that the likely forfeiture of money and real estate seized and/or restrained by law 
enforcement as a result of the Montreal and Toronto LTTE investigations will hurt the 
organization.    
 Lastly, the 2008 FATF Evaluation of Canada’s money laundering and terrorist 
financing regime may have identified deficiencies; however, these should not necessarily 
reflect on the efficacy of the strategy as a whole. Recently, Canada had an opportunity to 
test the criminal law component of the legislation with an individual involved in a plot to 
bomb London, England. His successful conviction is a reassuring message that the 
legislative process, despite criticism, is working. 
 The next two chapters will be dedicated to Tamil nationalism and the causes that 
compel many Tamil Canadians to continue funding the LTTE despite enjoying relative 
social stability in Canada. The primary source of data for these chapters is a preliminary 
survey administered to Tamil Canadians which examined the nature of the nationalistic 
sentiments felt towards the motherland and towards the general objectives of the LTTE.    
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Chapter Three: Tamil Canadian Nationalism Survey 
3.0 Tamil Nationalism 
 
 Tamil nationalism can be defined as the aspiration by some Tamil people to 
establish, at minimum, self determination within Sri Lanka. The principles of Tamil 
nationalism are to seek to preserve and modernize Tamil language and culture, unify 
Tamils across boundaries, abolish caste discrimination, elevate the economic status of 
Tamil people, and provide for a Tamil identity (Tamil nationalism, 2007). To measure the 
nationalistic sentiments of Tamil Canadians, an on-line survey was administered. 
However, the survey, conducted over the Internet, presented major challenges with 
respect to specifically targeting Tamil Canadians while ensuring anonymity and 
confidentiality. To be successful among the Tamil Canadian community, the survey had 
to ensure cultural sensibility and a respect for Tamil values. These challenges were met 
by presenting the survey prior to its administration to several acquaintances of the 
author.41 Although their role was limited, these individuals, all of whom were Sri Lankan 
Tamils, provided important feedback on the nature of the questions and the general 
methodology. 
In addition, a segment of the survey focused on the possibility that nationalistic 
fervor could be the nucleus and a contributing factor that enticed some Canadian Tamils 
to fund a free and independent Tamil state. If this were the case, new strategies would 
need to be developed by Canada to ensure that those funds were stopped or intercepted 
before being appropriated by organizations, such as the LTTE.     
                                                 
41 The Tamil acquaintances referred to above were introduced to the author by a mutual friend. All of 
whom have requested anonymity.  
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3.1 Survey Methodology  
 Electing the right survey method for this research was a significant challenge. For 
one, no researcher had ever approached the Canadian Tamil Diaspora in order to measure 
its nationalistic sentiments. Furthermore, getting the Tamil Diaspora to participate in a 
survey that fostered anonymity, confidentiality, but was random proved problematic.42  
For example, in 2004, a Canadian telephone survey was commissioned by a polling firm, 
Small World Communications, on behalf of the WTM to solicit Tamil respondents. The 
survey was meant to inquire whether or not the Tamil respondents had been subject to 
any type of intimidation or extortion by the WTM (Bell, 2004). The results of the survey 
revealed that the overwhelming majority of respondents (97.0 per cent) reported that they 
were not subjected to intimidation or extortion (Bell, 2004).  
 However, the method employed by the polling firm to survey the Canadian Tamil 
population is open to scrutiny. For instance, it is questionable how truthful respondents 
were to the questions knowing that the pollsters worked for the WTM. Furthermore, the 
fact that Tamil people were singled out and identified removed the protective wall of 
anonymity which is extremely important to have if results were to be trusted (Bell, 2004). 
For these reasons, and others related to time and budget, this study employed an Internet-
based survey that would allow for anonymity and confidentiality. 
      
3.1.1 Limitations of this Internet-Based Survey 
 There are many restrictions to Internet-based research. Although the Internet is 
becoming more and more popular, and an estimated 67% of Canadians have access to it, 
                                                 
42 Conducting a survey where the element of randomness is present is more desirable because it is 
theoretically the best way to identify a representative sample (Palys, 2003). This will be discussed further 
in the next section. 
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the Internet is not yet a venue that can be presumed to provide access to all segments of a 
population (Internet World Stats, 2008; Palys, 2003). For example, it is believed that the 
average Internet user is predominantly male, middle class, and has a better than average 
education (Palys, 2003). A potential problem with an Internet-based survey that aims to 
strictly protect the identity of respondents is that it becomes impossible to confirm 
whether or not the respondents belong to the targeted population. In an attempt to reduce 
the effect of this limitation, the author took a series of precautionary measures that will be 
explained below. 
 While many researchers admit that probabilistic sampling techniques that 
encompass taking a random sample and obtaining a representative cross section of a 
target population is more desirable, this study used a convenience sample method also 
known as the self-selection method. (Palys, 2003). 
  
3.1.2 The Convenience Sampling Method 
 
 Canadian Tamil citizens were made aware of the survey and how to access it 
through announcements in Tamil newspapers, identified through the Canadian Tamil 
Business Directory.43 These newspapers were subsequently contacted and inquiries were 
made as to whether they would print a public service announcement for a university 
survey. Editors representing the elected newspapers agreed to run the advertisement.44  
Once the newspaper ad was drafted, editors were re-contacted. This time, a copy of the ad 
was attached to their correspondence.45 Interestingly, three newspaper editors contacted 
the author and asked if they could view the survey questionnaire prior to running the 
                                                 
43 The Tamil Business Directory can be accessed at http://www.tamillisting.com/index.php?id=121 
44 A budget of $500.00 was made available for the newspaper ads which were scheduled to appear at 
different intervals over a period of five weeks. 
45 Please refer to Appendix C for an illustration of the newspaper ad. 
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advertisement.46 Following a review of the survey, two of the editors replied that their 
newspapers would not publish the ad. The third newspaper editor agreed to publish and 
remarked that the survey was not biased. The main reasons provided for not running the 
ad were that the survey questions could damage the newspapers’ reputation. The editors 
did not like certain questions, such as the ones dealing with financing and immigration 
status.47 
 It should be mentioned that the editors were contacted by the author to stress the 
importance of the study and emphasize its value in providing information about the level 
of nationalism felt by the community. Although the author restated that there would be no 
harm associated to any individual participating in the survey, and that other Tamils had 
found the questions to be non-offensive and respectful of Tamil cultural values, the 
editors remained unwilling to publish the ad unless questions were removed and/or 
amended. No further communications between the author and these editors took place.   
 Another avenue the author employed to promote the survey came after the survey 
went live. One of the comments provided by a respondent suggested that the author 
promote the survey through Tamil places of worship. Following this advice, the author 
identified a number of Tamil Hindu temples and Tamil churches. These were mainly 
located in the Greater Toronto area and in Quebec.48 In total, 28 locations could be 
confirmed as hosting Tamil congregations. These places of worship were sent a copy of 
the newspaper ad along with a note asking them to consider posting the ad in a visible 
                                                 
46 Please refer to Appendix A for the survey.  
47 Out of courtesy and respect for the editors’ opinions, the author has elected not to name the Tamil 
newspapers that refused to publish the ad. The other newspapers canvassed for this survey were the Agini 
Media, the Monsoon Journal, the Muzhakkam, the Suthanthiran, the Uthayan, the Veedu, and the Tamil 
Mirror. 
48 List of Hindu temples worshiped by the Tamil community in Canada were obtained from 
http://webhome.idirect.com/~krish/temple html and http://tamilelibrary.org/teli/temple1 html. 
Similarly, Tamil churches and other places of worship were identified at 
http://tamilyellowpages.com/ca/ListCat.aspx.  
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location for their Tamil congregation to see. Further follow-up was made to get a sense of 
how many of these places had posted the ad. However, due to a language barrier, only 
five confirmed that they posted the ad. Lastly, a copy of the newspaper ad was e-mailed 
to the Canadian Tamil Congress asking it to consider letting its membership know about 
the survey.49 No further follow-up was made. All the above entities were contacted in an 
effort to cover as broad a spectrum as possible of the Canadian Tamil community.   
 As explained earlier, the convenience sample method was selected because this 
was the ideal approach to reach and set Tamil Canadians apart from the general 
population. As can be seen on Figure 3 below, 442 hits were registered on the website. Of 
these, a slight majority (52.7 per cent) completed the survey, approximately one-fifth 
(19.5 per cent) abandoned the survey in progress, and slightly more than one-quarter 
(27.8 per cent) viewed the survey, but chose not to participate in the study.  
 Unfortunately, the convenience sampling method adopted for this research had 
other limitations. For example, it was impossible to determine whether this sample was 
representative of Canadian Tamils. Although some basic demographic information was 
obtained (see Appendix B), the author is not aware of any data available on Tamil 
Canadians that could assist in determining whether or not the sample in this study was a 
representative population.   
                                                 
49 The Canadian Tamil Congress was established in 2000 as the unified voice of the Canadian Tamil 
community. The CTC has avidly worked to integrate various Tamil community service organizations and 
individuals from coast to coast in an effort to better represent and serve its nationwide community. 
http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/ 
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Figure 3. Survey Statistics Overview (n = 442) 
52.7%
19.5%
27.8%
Completed
Abandoned in Progress
Viewed but not Started
 
 
Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that those who visited the website and completed 
the survey may have been those who felt most strongly about the issue or may not have 
been Tamils. This poses a risk in that the results may be distorted. Consequently, the data 
presented in this major paper must be considered exploratory and not representative.50   
 
3.2 Chapter Summary 
 This survey, administered to Tamil Canadians, was meant to measure their 
nationalistic sentiments towards the motherland and the contributing factors that led a 
number of them to support the general aspirations of the LTTE. Electing the right survey 
method was a considerable challenge. Ultimately, the convenience sampling method was 
selected because it increased the probability that exclusively Tamil Canadians would 
participate with the study, despite the inherent risks that responses would be distorted and 
perhaps not representative of all Tamil Canadians’ opinions. In the end, the data 
                                                 
50 Please note that although anonymity and confidentiality were ensured, the author firmly believes that the 
respondents were Tamil Canadians. This belief is supported by the fact that the author only advertized the 
survey site through Tamil Canadian media. Furthermore, the 110 comments collected through the research 
strongly suggested that the respondents were Tamils as many referred to their ethnicity in the comments 
and demonstrated a current knowledge of the intricacies of the Sri Lankan conflict. 
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advanced in this research must be examined as exploratory and not necessarily 
characteristic of Tamil Canadians.  
  
 
59
Chapter Four: Analysis and Discussion of Survey 
Results  
 
4.0 General Demographics of Sample 
 
 Prior to examining the nature of the nationalist fervency and the support of the 
LTTE by Tamil Canadians, it is necessary to elaborate upon the demographics of the 
sample population under this study. A wide range of variables could conceivably explain 
the differences between individuals who may be more inclined to hold firm nationalist 
sentiments towards the motherland and give support to the LTTE. For the purposes of 
this exploratory analysis, in addition to a univariate analysis of the key survey questions, 
age, gender, marital status, education level, year of immigration to Canada, gross income, 
and languages spoken, will be examined as independent variables that might influence 
such sentiments.  
 Of those who provided information about gender (n = 272), nearly three-quarters 
(73.2 percent) were males. Rather than asking respondents to provide their actual age, the 
survey provided five age groups to choose from. The largest proportion of respondents 
(27.6 per cent) was between 36 to 45 years old. However, the sample was relatively 
evenly distributed between the five age groups. Specifically, 15.1% of the sample 
reported being between 18 to 25 years old, nearly one-quarter (23.5 per cent) indicated 
they were 26 to 35 years old, approximately one-quarter (18.7 per cent) were 46 to 55 
years old, and the remaining 15.1% identified themselves as 56 years old or older.    
 In terms of marital status, slightly more than two-thirds (68.7 per cent) indicated 
that they were married and nearly everyone else (24.6 per cent) reported that they were 
single. When asked if they still had a family member living in Sri Lanka, only three 
participants chose to respond. While there is no clear explanation for this, it is possible 
  
 
60
that respondents did not answer this question because they did not trust that their 
responses would remain anonymous and that family members might be identified.    
 In terms of where participants were born (n = 270), the overwhelming majority 
(92.2 per cent) were born in Sri Lanka, while a very small proportion (4.4 per cent) 
reported being born in Canada. Among those born outside of Canada (n = 255), nearly 
one-third (29.4 per cent) had completed high school, while an additional 18% had 
obtained an undergraduate degree. Only a very small proportion (5.1 per cent) indicated 
that they did not have any education. By comparison, among those few who indicated 
that they were born in Canada (n = 12), five stated that they had completed some 
university, while three had completed university and three had completed graduate 
school. Of all the respondents who indicated that they were born in Sri Lanka, the 
majority (85.5 per cent) came from the Jaffna area. 
 A key issue for this study was Tamil ethnicity. Given this, respondents were 
asked to self-identify their Tamil ethnicity. Of all those who answered the question  
(n = 271), the overwhelming majority (88.5 per cent) indicated that they were Ceylon 
Tamils. Only a very small proportion (1.5 per cent) stated that they were 
Indian/Plantation Tamils. When participants were asked what languages they spoke, all 
(n = 269) responded that they spoke Tamil. Furthermore, among this group, a large 
majority (85.1 per cent) spoke English, while a smaller proportion (27.5 per cent) 
indicated that they could converse in Sinhala. Additionally, French was spoken only by a 
small minority (6.0 per cent) of respondents. 
 Inquiries into the year the participants immigrated to Canada (n = 270) indicated 
that slightly more than half (53.0 per cent) arrived between 1991 and 2008. A slightly 
smaller, but still large group (41.1 per cent) reported that they emigrated between 1981 
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and 1990, while a very small proportion (1.4 per cent) arrived in Canada before 1981. 
When participants were asked how they entered Canada (n = 252), over half (53.6 per 
cent) indicated they had arrived as refugees and slightly more than one-third (34.9 per 
cent) had been sponsored. When asked to specify in which province the participants 
resided (n = 263), the overwhelming majority (95.1 per cent) indicated that they lived in 
Ontario.51   
 Lastly, when participants were sollicited to provide information about their gross 
income (n = 258), slightly more than one-fifth (27.9 per cent) reported that they earned 
between $25,000.00 and $49,999.00. A nearly equal proportion (27.1 per cent) reported 
that they made between $50,000.00 and $74,999.00, while approximately one-fifth (21.3 
per cent) admitted to earning less than $24,999.00.    
 To summarize, the typical person who completed this survey was a married male 
between the ages of 26 to 55 years old who was born in Sri Lanka and came from Jaffna 
or the Northern Province. The typical respondent self-reported as a Ceylon Tamil, 
completed high school or a higher education, and arrived in Canada after 1981 either as a 
refugee or sponsored immigrant. Finally, the individual spoke Tamil and English, lived in 
Ontario, and typically earned between $25,000.00 and $74,999.00.52   
        
                                                 
51 While the survey targeted Tamil Canadians across Canada, the Tamil newspapers who advertised the 
survey were mainly distributed in Ontario. 
52 It is difficult to estimate the general demographics of Tamil Canadians as very little data is available on 
the subject. However, in spite of this, some data regarding the economic conditions of Canadian Tamils is 
available. For example, the Encyclopedia of Canada’s Peoples reported that, in 1991, of a small sample of 
individuals who reported Tamil as their first language (30,220 people), approximately 50% indicated that 
they earned less than $10,000.00 a year, and 20% reported an income between $10,000.00 and $20,000.00.  
Another 20% reported that they earned between $20,000.00 and $40,000.00 while approximately 3% 
reported that they earned between $40,000.00 and $60,000.00. Lastly, less than 1% reported that they 
earned over $60,000.00 (Magocsi, 1999).    
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4.1 Survey Analysis 
 Respondents were asked a series of questions about their feelings towards the 
motherland, the current ethnic conflict, and how they perceived the LTTE. Results were 
analyzed to identify any statistically significant differences and the degree to which 
demographic variables influenced the participants’ general sentiments. Interestingly, 
although many combinations of demographic variables were tested against non-
demographic data, only a few analyses provided statistically significant results. In 
addition, other key independent variables which analysis was deemed uninteresting to the 
study of this major paper were not included.    
 A key measure of general attitude towards the conflict in Sri Lanka is whether an 
individual believed that that Tamils and Sinhalese could coexist within an island state. Of 
all the participants who answered this question (n = 259), approximately two-third (68.3 
per cent) did not believe that Tamils and Sinhalese could coexist. This result should be 
seen in the context of a population that has been and is widely perceived to be subjected 
to continued human rights violations perpetrated against civilian Tamils by the Sri 
Lankan government (U.S. Department of State, 2008). This perception of harassment or 
systematic discrimination at the hands of the Sinhalese government is reflected in the 
following statement by one respondent:53 
“Despite I am a professionally qualified accountant and a law-abiding, peace loving individual, I was 
troubled by the Sri Lankan authorities for being a Tamil. Thus, I firmly believe, like almost all of the 
Tamils, Sinhalese and the Tamils can never co-exist”.54   
 
The participant’s strong feelings about the Tamils and the Sinhalese being unable to co-
exist are indicative of a Tamil population that perceives the Sinhalese government as 
systematically racist and incapable of governing justly. In short, this sentiment of 
                                                 
53 All quotes by survey respondents mentioned in this major paper were taken verbatim. Grammar and 
spelling mistakes were not corrected.  
54 Male, 36-45 years old, born in the Jaffna area. 
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injustice and discrimination provides a rationale for resistance to the state and 
undermines a political solution. This cynicism towards the real or imagined incapability 
of the Sinhalese government to treat Tamils as equals has and will continue to unleash 
stronger actions and reactions to what is perceived as an imposition on their basic 
freedoms. 
 In terms of how Tamil Canadians perceived an armed struggle as the only way to 
resolve the ethnic conflict, slightly more than half (54.3 per cent) of those who answered 
(n = 258) this question agreed that an armed struggle was the only solution. The fact that 
a majority, however small, of the sample study favored an armed conflict is striking. A 
variable of note on this issue may be age. In effect, slightly more than two-thirds of 
people over the age of 36 years (68.5 per cent) agreed that an armed struggle was the only 
answer.55 Yet, the favoring of an armed conflict as the only viable solution must be 
understood in light of the above point that the Tamil Diaspora community under study 
views any viable political solution as conflicting with co-existence. In other words, 
critical to understanding why armed conflict is favored over a political solution is the 
historical failure of the peace process.56 
 Another key issue was the degree to which respondents agreed that the 
establishment of an independent Tamil state would bring an end to the armed struggle. 
                                                 
55 Data for this cross-tabulation was not statistically significant for any age group. Of note, while only a 
minority of respondents under the age of 35 (31.5 per cent) believed in an armed struggle, the majority of 
those over the age of 36 (68.5 per cent), believed this to be the only answer. These results could be 
interpreted as, the older the individuals are the more likely they will have experienced the historical failure 
of the peace process, and the institutional racism resulting from the pro-Sinhalese nationalist movement. 
Therefore, they may be more inclined to believe that an armed struggle is the only solution to resolve the 
ethnic conflict.  
56 The Peace Process in Sri Lanka can be traced back to 1957, when S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and 
Chelvanayakam introduced the BC Pact, mentioned in Chapter One. The pact was abrogated when under 
pressure from the Sinhalese clergy Bandaranaike had to break his word. The BC Pact was the first attempt 
of many peace processes taking place in 1965, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995, and 2002. All of which were 
unsuccessful in restoring an acceptable balance to Tamil rights and may have had a significant impact in 
favoring armed conflict over political solutions (Bouffard & Carment, 2006).  
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This vital theme, at the heart of the current conflict, was answered by 258 participants, of 
which the large majority (83.3 per cent) agreed.57 Given the political reality of a detested 
Sri Lankan government by its Tamil minority, it is no surprise that the majority of Tamil 
Canadian respondents firmly believed that the establishment of an independent Tamil 
state was the only answer to political stability. To this effect, four respondents 
volunteered opinions that supported this perspective. 
“I strongly believe that the recognition of an independent state for the Sri Lankan Tamils is the only 
way to prevent further atrocities in Sri Lanka”.58  
    
“I am in favour (sic) of a Tamil Eelam because it is clear that the Sri Lankan Government cannot 
recognize our culture, our language, and our Tamil heritage. We tried and tried to coexist with them for 
many years, but it failed because the government continues to ignore our cries. The Tamil voice goes 
unheard of in Sri Lanka”.59 
 
“Separation is the only solution!”60   
 
“I wish to live in my own Tamil land before I die!”61  
 
This overwhelming belief by participants may be a signal that, for many, only the 
establishment of an independent Tamil state will safeguard Tamil culture and heritage. In 
short, these results demonstrated that respondents perceived that they were under an 
existential threat from the Sinhalese state. This existential plight is essential to 
understanding the militant nationalism which pervades the community. As noted above, 
the threat that the Sinhalese government poses to the Tamil national existence is 
overwhelmingly viewed to be dire. These results further the belief that the support of the 
LTTE by this group, ideologically or otherwise, may be because the LTTE is viewed as 
the only entity defending Tamils.   
                                                 
57 A Chi Square calculation for gender on this issue failed to reveal any statistically significant results.  
58 Male, 18-25 years old, born in the Jaffna area. 
59 Male, 18-25 years old, born in Canada. 
60 Male, 56+ years old, born in the Jaffna area.  
61 Female, 46-55 years old, born in the Colombo area. 
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 The nationalist narrative that armed conflict is the only viable path to self-
determination and survival is also strongly reflected in the popular belief that the LTTE, 
despite their brutality, are freedom fighters and not terrorists. Of all the individuals who 
answered the question about whether the LTTE should be considered freedom fighters  
(n = 251), an overwhelming majority (94.8 per cent) believed this to be the case.   
Interestingly, of those who viewed the LTTE as freedom fighters, an overwhelming 
majority (93.1 per cent) indicated that they also supported the LTTE for government.62  
The implications of these two issues are clear. On the one hand, the results imply that, 
regardless of the LTTE being branded as a terrorist group by Sri Lanka and the 
international community, the great majority of respondents continued to believe in their 
cause and saw them as liberators. Second, it is conceivable that such overwhelming 
support would be followed by unwavering loyalty. Many Tamils have long lost faith with 
the Sri Lankan’s government’s ability to make peace with them and may see the 
government’s renewed war efforts as being prosecuted on the premise that every Tamil 
killed is a gain (UTHR, 2008). Consequently, it is no surprise that many participants 
viewed the LTTE as freedom fighters, as exhibited by the following four quotes: 
“Thanks for taking YOUR time to study us, Tamils, in Canada. Also, I strongly believe that if the 
President of Sri Lanka stops discriminating us and treats all civilians equally, Sri Lanka can also be a 
peaceful country. The LTTE are just there to help us get freedom, I don't know why the world is 
looking at them as terrorists. I just wish someone could change the government in Sri Lanka to one that 
treats everyone equally. The Sinhalese people are not the problem - IT’S THE GOVERNMENT!”63   
 
“I consider the Tigers as Freedom Fighters and whats going on in Sri Lanka is a war and not terrosims 
[sic] and counter terrorism”.64 
 
“I believe that the cause of freedom fighters is true, but there are few that take advantage and abuse 
there authority. As we have, there is no grantee that once LTTE gain's control, that all Tamil will be 
treated equally (which caused the war initially)”. [sic]65  
 
                                                 
62 00.0,690.831  p)x2(  
63 Female, 18-25 years old, born in the Jaffna area. 
64 Male, 36-45 years old, born in the Jaffna area. 
65 Male, 18-25 years old, born in the Jaffna area. 
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“The association of the word terrorism with the LTTE is in my view purely a propaganda by the State 
to demonize the justified freedom struggle of the Tamils. Its an effortless attempt by the State to 
seperate [sic] Tamils from the LTTE. LTTE is a front line National Resistance Army which has 
consistently stood by the real aspirations of the Tamil People. Calling it a rebel group or terrorist group 
is an outcome of lack of knowledge and ill informed act. First step to resoluting the war in Sri Lanka is 
to stop looking at it as fight against terrorism. Look at it as a war. War between two distinct group of 
people whose culture, language, historical lands are different”. [sic]66 
 
Given the participants’ strongly held views that the LTTE were there to represent them 
and their interests, it is no wonder that many would go to the extent of patronizing LTTE 
activities. This could be accomplished through organizations, such as the WTM, that 
have an appearance of legitimacy. Tamils all over the world believe the liberation 
struggle to be legitimate and will lend their support, ideologically or otherwise, to 
whoever is representing their interests ("Sri Lanka's failure to end conflict is dangerous: 
rights group," 2008; UTHR, 2008).     
 On the related issue of whether the LTTE should be considered a terrorist group, 
of those who responded (n = 179), only a very small proportion (7.8 per cent) reported 
that they felt the LTTE were a terrorist group. Interestingly, among those who felt that 
the LTTE were a terrorist group, nearly three-quarters (71.4 per cent) affirmed that they 
would not support the LTTE for government. Still, this suggested that a sizeable segment 
of people would support the LTTE for government even though they believed the LTTE 
constituted a terrorist group.67    
  With the LTTE having so much support among respondents, it was conceivable 
that many would financially support the group or any of its organizations. However, what 
was not clear was whether financial support to the LTTE was coerced. This critical issue 
was very important to determine because of contradictory reports received from the 
media, human rights organizations, the police, and the intelligence community that Tamil 
                                                 
66 Male, 26-35 years old, born in the Colombo district. 
67 00.0,290.481  p)x2(  
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Canadians were under pressure and/or coerced by the LTTE to contribute financially 
towards an independent Tamil state. Of those participants who answered the question 
about financing (n = 233), a near majority (46.4 per cent) conceded that they did finance 
organizations that supported an independent Tamil state, such as WTM or LTTE. 
Interestingly, among that group, nearly two-thirds (63.9 per cent) also believed that the 
only solution to resolve the conflict in Sri Lanka was through an armed struggle.68 
Additionally, the overwhelming majority (91.7 per cent) of those who financially 
contributed were also of the opinion that the establishment of an independent Tamil state 
would bring an end to the armed conflict.69 The following two quotes taken from the 
survey provided some insight as to the motives individuals had for contributing 
financially: 
“As a student, I am unable to contribute financially for such causes. However, I would definitely 
contribute upon recieving stable income”. [sic]70 
 
“If the Israelis can collect money among Canadian Jewish society to support Israel fight against 
Palestine and Lebanon then why can’t we Tamils do the same? Where is the balance in this act? Our 
(Tamil) liberators are not terrorists; they are freedom fighters with no or little help from the 
international community and trying to protect their people from genocide and other state crimes. I 
don’t think the international community understands the real struggle of Tamils. If they do then they 
will never support the Sinhala regime with finances and ammunitions. (Even Canada provided blood 
stained Sinhala regime with latest and more powerful radar equipments recently).71 The bottom line is 
international community does not care about us Tamils because we have nothing to offer them in 
return other than our hard working skills and the forthrightness (meaning no oil or other stuff to make 
the capitalists happy)”.72  
 
Although nearly half of the respondents (46.4 per cent) admitted they financially 
contributed to organizations such as the WTM or the LTTE, it is speculated that many 
                                                 
68 01.0,506.61  p)x2(  
69 03.0,298.104  p)x2(  
70 Female, 18-25 years old, born in the Jaffna area. 
71 Raytheon Canada, which is owned by a U.S. corporation, did sell radar technology capable of monitoring 
small vessels used by the LTTE to the Sri Lankan government with the assistance of the Canadian 
Commercial Corporation (CCC). It is the author’s opinion that even though Sri Lanka is considered a 
democracy, the CCC, which is a Crown agency that helps Canadian firms to market products overseas, 
should have exercised more due diligence before selling the equipment. This is because Canada is home to 
the largest Tamil Diaspora outside of Sri Lanka and, as such, it should be more sensitive to the current 
conflict there and not behave in a manner that can be misconstrued as taking sides (CCC, 2008; 
Rajakaruna, 2008).  
72 Male, 26-35 years old, born in the Jaffna area. 
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more participants may give their financial support to the “cause”. This hypothesis is 
conceivable given the strong support for the LTTE reported by respondents.  
Furthermore, if the results of this survey were representative of the larger Canadian Tamil 
community, it would be reasonable to speculate that a majority of them financially 
support the LTTE. If, intelligence reports discussed earlier are to be believed that the 
LTTE’s fundraising activities in Canada generate several millions per year, then, it is safe 
to assume that the majority of Canadian Tamil households support the LTTE.   
 Interestingly, in an April 2009 National Post article, it was reported that many 
Canadian Tamils who came from the Colombo area, where both Tamils and Sinhalese 
live together, aspired to see a similar pluralism for the northern part of Sri Lanka (Kumar, 
Mohamad, & Benedict, 2009). However, the result of the survey for this paper indicated 
otherwise. For instance, although the number of participants from the Colombo area was 
small (n = 13), the majority (61.5 per cent) admitted they financed organizations that 
supported an independent Tamil state. Moreover, slightly more than four-fifths (84.6 per 
cent) viewed the LTTE as freedom fighters. The only notable difference between this 
Tamil group and those coming from the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka was that 
most individuals from the Colombo area (57.1 per cent) believed Tamils and Sinhalese 
could coexist within an island state. This was not the case with people from Jaffna (n = 
209), in which only a small minority (28.2 per cent) believed in Tamils and Sinhalese 
coexistence within an island state. Participants from the Eastern Province (n = 10) who 
believed Sinhalese and Tamils could coexist were also in the minority (40.0 per cent). 
Although not statistically significant, this data may suggest that no matter where in Sri 
Lanka Tamil Canadians are from, they harbor strong nationalist sentiments and believe in 
the LTTE’s cause. As history has shown, Tamils from the Colombo area were the ones 
  
 
69
that suffered the most casualties during the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom. Given this, it is not 
surprising that expatriates from that area support the LTTE. Nonetheless, since they 
coexisted with Sinhalese at one time, it may not be unexpected that the majority believed 
Tamil and Sinhalese could coexist again within an island state. It is also interesting to 
note that none of the participants who answered that they contributed financially towards 
an independent Tamil state indicated that they were coerced. All respondents conceded 
that they contributed on a voluntary basis.73 Still, among them, a minority (10.0 per cent) 
indicated that they felt obliged to financially contribute. This sentiment of obligation is 
particularly well encapsulated in one of the respondents’ quote: 
“I cannot forget who I am and where I came from. Therefore, it is my responcibility [sic] to support 
my nation”.74   
 
 Another critical issue was whether participants financially contributed to any 
other causes in Sri Lanka. To this end, of the individuals who answered this question  
(n = 239), the majority (56.5 per cent) conceded that they did. Among the multiple causes 
Canadian Tamils supported, 28% donated to the rehabilitation of Internally Displaced 
People (IDP’s), 22.9% donated to building villages, 30.7% donated to education, 11.9% 
donated to culture and arts, and 29.8% sent money to family members.75 What is 
interesting about these results is that when combined, the total number of participants 
who made financial contributions to any causes (i.e. contributed to organizations that 
support an independent Tamil state, rehabilitation of IDP’s, building villages, education, 
culture, and family support), amounted to nearly three-quarters (71.1 per cent) of 
participants. While these findings might provide the researcher with some insight as to 
what activities are funded by the participants, it is open to speculation whether the people 
                                                 
73 049.0,537.94  p)x2(  
74 Male, 26-35 years old, born in the Jaffna area. 
75 Note that participants could elect has many choices as applicable. Therefore the total exceeds 100%.  
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who contributed to the rehabilitation of IDP’s, building villages, education, culture, and 
family, knew, with any degree of certainty, that their funds were used for their intended 
purpose. As seen with the example of the WTM earlier, funds collected for one specific 
purpose (i.e. cultural event) could be diverted and used to support the LTTE. Therefore, it 
is possible that given the sophisticated set-up of the LTTE in Canada, through 
organizations such as the WTM, a portion of money raised for any purpose could end up 
in the coffers of the LTTE.       
 In Canada, particularly since the first quarter of 2008, efforts by the police to 
disrupt LTTE financing operations have been on the rise. In March 2008, a Greater 
Toronto Area LTTE collector was arrested near Vancouver, British Columbia and 
charged with terrorist financing (Matas & Freeze, 2008). In June 2008, the WTM was 
placed on Canada’s list of banned terrorist entities and all its bank accounts and buildings 
were restrained (Davermann, 2008; Public Safety Canada, 2008). These actions by police 
against the LTTE and the WTM demonstrated Canada’s efforts to fulfill its international 
commitments to combat terrorist financing. Moreover, these efforts signaled that Canada 
was no longer willing to be perceived as a haven for terrorist financing or willing to 
tolerate these types of activities. 
 Based on the high percentage of participants who viewed the LTTE as freedom 
fighters (94.8 per cent), one could wonder whether the actions of the police to target 
LTTE operatives in Canada would be considered favorably by respondents. Not 
surprisingly, among respondents (n = 219), a large proportion (82.6 per cent) did not 
agree with the police actions to target the LTTE. This suggests that the police are not 
likely to get the full cooperation of the Tamil community in combating terrorist financing 
in relation to LTTE operations in Canada. In spite of this, it is paramount that the police 
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continue to seek strategies to develop the trust of the Canadian Tamil Diaspora in an 
effort to stem the flow of funds dedicated to the LTTE. 
 
4.2 Chapter Summary 
 In conclusion, a preliminary analysis of the results showed that Tamil Canadians 
held very strong nationalistic sentiments towards their motherland. Furthermore, the 
results indicated that respondents were passionate and well-informed about current issues 
in Sri Lanka. Of utmost importance, they strongly supported the LTTE which they 
viewed as freedom fighters, not terrorists. This latter finding was not surprising when one 
considers the long history of conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil 
people. The obvious disregard for Tamil human rights since the renewal of hostilities 
with the LTTE is not likely to increase the government’s popularity vis-à-vis Tamils.   
 The abiding loyalty to the motherland by the Canadian Tamil Diaspora and the 
ideology shared with the LTTE will ensure that the Diaspora will continue to financially 
support the LTTE regardless of how the latter is viewed by the rest of the world.  
Although a substantial number of survey participants reported that they financially 
contributed to organizations supporting an independent Tamil state, the probability is that 
a larger proportion of Tamil Canadians finance the LTTE. Lastly, since a large proportion 
(82.6 per cent) of participants indicated that they did not support Canadian police 
endeavors against the LTTE, it is imperative that the police seek new strategies to gain 
the trust of the Tamil community if Diaspora funding to the LTTE is to be effectively 
thwarted. This will be a daunting task because the Canadian Tamil Diaspora will likely 
perceive cooperation with the police as a set-back, with the ultimate result benefiting the 
Sri Lanka government’s agenda to the detriment of Tamil culture, language, and heritage.  
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In the following section, the role of Canada and the effect it could have on developing a 
solution to the conflict will be discussed.   
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Chapter Five: Achieving Peace in Sri Lanka  
 
5.0 The Role of Canada  
 According to the Government of Canada’s website, Canada and Sri Lanka have 
strong bilateral ties as a result of their membership within the Commonwealth 
(Government of Canada, 2008). In spite of this, Canada remains deeply concerned over 
the 2008 ceasefire breakdown and the gross violation of human rights by the Sri Lankan 
government paramilitary and security forces, as well as by the LTTE (Government of 
Canada, 2008). Canada's main foreign policy objectives in Sri Lanka are to help the Sri 
Lankan Government and the LTTE put an end to the conflict and find a viable political 
solution (Government of Canada, 2008). Canada’s position is that there can be no 
military solution to the conflict, and that some form of political power-sharing within a 
united country may be suitable. However, Canada’s genuine interests in resolving the 
conflict is questioned by some Canadian Tamils who see Canada’s efforts as being one-
sided, especially since Canada banned both the LTTE and the WTM (Bell, 2008d; 
Offman, 2008). However, through the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), Canada disbursed over $29.3 million in Sri Lanka during the fiscal year 2006-
2007 (CIDA, 2008a, 2008b). Although there is no doubt that many on-going projects, 
such as those associated to post-tsunami reconstruction, humanitarian aid, support for 
language rights, and gender equality have greatly helped Sri Lankans,76 a perception 
seems to exist that Canada is not doing enough politically to bring peace to the region.  
Nonetheless, Canada has played an important role for peace in Sri Lanka. For example, in 
2002, Canada sent a team of experts to Sri Lanka in order to convince the warring 
                                                 
76 Although Sri Lankans have benefitted from Canadian aid, Canadian Tamil Congress spokesperson David 
Poopalapillai voiced that little of that aid had been given to the island’s Tamil areas ("Peace in Sri Lanka 
sought at Scarborough rally," 2007).    
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factions to adopt federalism as part of a Norway brokered Cease-Fire Agreement between 
the government and the LTTE (Deverell, 2003). Although federalism was not adopted, 
Canada’s efforts contributed to the general Cease-Fire Agreement.      
 Unfortunately, with the Sri Lankan government’s official withdrawal from the 
peace process in January 2008, the possibility of having Sri Lanka adopt federalism may 
have suffered a temporary set-back (A. Jeyaraj, 2007). This is especially true since the 
government has undertaken a new military offensive in the north against the LTTE 
(Farrell, 2007). Since the spring of 2008, the Sri Lankan Army has made significant 
advances in formerly held LTTE controlled areas and captured many of its strongholds 
(Venugopalan, 2008). In spite of the military gains by the government against the LTTE, 
the situation is alleged to have created a humanitarian crisis ("Sri Lanka: ICRC maintains 
support for hospital hit by shelling," 2009). For example, as of February 16, 2009, it was 
estimated that 250,000 civilians were trapped in a shrinking sliver of land approximately 
139 kilometers square in size: an area (north east)77 that was still controlled by the LTTE 
(Nessman, 2009; Sri Lanka, 2009).  
 Although the government of Sri Lanka has created safe areas for Tamil civilians 
to seek refuge, many people distrust these areas and believe, that once they have crossed 
over, they will become vulnerable to a process of detention (J. Perera, 2009a; Tremonti, 
2009, February 13).78 The woes of the Tamil civilians are further aggravated by the 
attitude of the Sri Lankan government, who in a statement voiced the position that those 
who did not leave LTTE-controlled areas would be deemed LTTE members or their 
                                                 
77 According to Sri Lanka’s Defense website, visited on February 16, 2009, the last stronghold of the LTTE 
is located in the Mullaittivu District and is approximately 139 kilometers square in size (Sri Lanka, 2009). 
78 Many Tamil civilians will not cross over into Sri Lankan safe areas because they received mandatory 
LTTE training as civilian militias and, as such, believe they will be imprisoned once in government 
territory. Others preferred to remain within the LTTE-controlled area because they have family members 
with the LTTE (J. Perera, 2009a; Tremonti, 2009, February 13). 
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supporters (J. Perera, 2009a). The Sri Lankan Army’s zeal to seek and destroy the last 
LTTE operatives has been so great that it has indiscriminately bombed any areas where it 
suspects LTTE cadres to be hiding (J. Perera, 2009b). It would appear that the Sri Lankan 
government’s war on terrorism has breached the very tenets of democracy and 
humanitarian laws, in that hospitals have been targeted, and Tamil civilians have been 
killed or severely injured by shelling (Arulpragasam, 2009; "Sri Lanka: Vanni hospital 
shelled," 2009). The LTTE has used those same civilians as human shields and, has 
reportedly fired at people fleeing to the safe zones (Jayasinghe, 2009). Although the Sri 
Lankan government vehemently denies that a humanitarian crisis is taking place in the 
north, the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is the only international 
organization with on-site teams in the war zone, continues to report much human 
suffering and devastation among Tamil civilians ("Sri Lanka: ICRC evacuates more sick 
and wounded from the Vanni," 2009; "Sri Lanka: ICRC evacuates over 240 wounded and 
sick from the Vanni by sea," 2009).79    
 From the moment the Sri Lankan government withdrew from the Cease-Fire 
Agreement in early 2008, Canada expressed concerns that this gesture would make it 
more difficult for peace to be restored and that violence on both sides would likely 
increase ("UN, US, Canada, and Norway blast Sri Lanka on CFA withdrawal," 2008).    
With many Tamil civilians in the north being caught between the two warring factions, 
Canada’s worst fears may come true. It is now time for Canada to take a more aggressive 
stance in the conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. As home to the 
                                                 
79 The organization Reporters without Borders has urged the Sri Lankan government to allow Sri Lankan 
and foreign journalists a free access to the north to report on the situation. It has also called for an end to 
intimidation and attacks on news media that refused to support the government and a military solution. 
Government critic and newspaper editor Lasantha Wickrematungue was murdered on January 8, 2009 by 
suspected government supporters (BBC News, 2009; Coles, 2009, January 16; "Government urged to let 
press visit north freely," 2009). 
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largest Tamil Diaspora outside Sri Lanka, Canada has an obligation to prevent a full scale 
humanitarian crisis and call for some sort of ceasefire. During a Special Parliamentary 
session on February 4, 2009, Members of Parliament proposed a sequenced framework 
for conflict resolution (Gamage, 2009a). This proposal contained six points that Members 
of Parliament believed would propel the warring factions towards an end to the conflict.  
The proposal included: an immediate ceasefire with a framework for a sustained and 
enduring end to hostilities; a return to the negotiating table; the Sri Lankan government 
must allow unimpeded access to international aid workers; domestic and foreign reporters 
must be given unrestricted access to the conflict zone; the Sri Lankan government must 
cease and desist targeting civilians in protected zones; and for Canada to support the call 
for the appointment of a United Nations special envoy to monitor and guard against 
abuses and to assist the peace process (Canada, 2009).  
 Among the above recommendations, Conservative government ministers who 
participated in the debate were unanimous that a call to a ceasefire and a return to the 
negotiating table were essential (Gamage, 2009b). Although pushing for a ceasefire and a 
return to negotiation seem the right thing to do in light of the alleged humanitarian crisis, 
Canada must be careful. According to Tamil politician and leader of the Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF) Veerasingham Anandasangaree,80 there can be no truce with the 
LTTE. Anandasangaree added that entering into a ceasefire and negotiations with the 
LTTE would be counter-productive because they would use the opportunity to rearm 
themselves and become a more powerful entity (S. Perera, 2009). Anandasangaree’s 
views are unquestionably shared by Sri Lanka’s government, which through its High 
                                                 
80 Veerasingham Anandasangaree is a former teacher and lawyer who became the political leader of the 
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 2002. In 2006, Anandasangaree was named as the winner of the 
UNESCO-Mandajeet Singh Prize for the Promotion of Tolerance and Non-Violence. Anandasangaree is an 
outspoken critic of the LTTE who advocates a federal solution for Sri Lanka’s ethnic problems. Ref: 
(Veerasingham Anandasangaree, 2009). 
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Commissioner to Canada, Daya Perera, shared concerns that history had shown there 
could be no guarantee the LTTE would adhere to any promises if the government 
declared a ceasefire ("Will Canada Intervene? Sri Lankan Envoy Asks Sarcastically," 
2009). 
 Despite the inherent risk that the LTTE would take advantage of any truce and 
rearm themselves, Canada must still appeal to the Sri Lankan government to seek, at the 
very least, a temporary ceasefire to allow Tamils caught in the middle to come to areas of 
safety. But, having Canada push for the Sri Lankan government to negotiate with the 
LTTE is a moot point because the Sri Lankan government and Tamil leaders, like 
Anandasangaree, do not believe the LTTE represent all the Sri Lankan Tamils (S. Perera, 
2009; "Will Canada Intervene? Sri Lankan Envoy Asks Sarcastically," 2009). Whether 
the LTTE represent all the Tamils is irrelevant. At the time of the writing of this paper 
(April 2009), the LTTE is facing imminent military defeat. As such, it is imperative that 
the government reaches some agreement with the LTTE as they could still manage to 
return to a guerrilla campaign and terrify Sri Lanka for years to come (Jayasekara, 2009; 
Venugopalan, 2009). The prowess of two Black Air Tiger suicide pilots in February 2009 
that managed to leave an army-surrounded area in northern Sri Lanka and drop bombs in 
Colombo before being shot down is a reminder that even when cornered, the LTTE is a 
formidable adversary that should not be underestimated (Sengupta & McDonald, 2009). 
 Given all the intricacies of the conflict and recognizing that Sri Lanka has a 
problem with Tamil rights, Canada may wish to remind the Sri Lankan government that 
some kind of political solution that gives acceptance to the valid claims of Tamils to 
some form of autonomy within Sri Lanka (i.e. federalism) would be desirable (J. Perera, 
2009b). In a recent interview with the Sri Lankan newspaper the Daily Mirror on the 
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subject of Sri Lanka, Professor Noam Chomsky commented that people who fought with 
or supported the LTTE should be provided with a form of amnesty. Furthermore, 
Chomsky suggested the establishment of a truth commission that would bring to light 
atrocities and crimes committed by both sides. Such commission, which would 
encompass investigative functions, but not have punitive powers, would be, in his 
opinion, a step towards reconciliation (J. Perera, 2009b).81 Chomsky’s suggestions make 
sense and are far from being unrealistic. For example, in the past, the Sri Lankan 
government has demonstrated its flexibility in accommodating and not prosecuting 
members of the LTTE, provided they were willing to renounce LTTE objectives and join 
mainstream society (J. Perera, 2009c). Former LTTE militant Colonel Karuna’s situation 
is a case in point.82 As such, Canada should embrace Chomsky’s perspectives, but not 
before calling for an unconditional surrender by the LTTE. This would show that Canada 
supports the war on terrorism that Sri Lanka is leading. However, once an unconditional 
surrender is secured, it would be paramount for Sri Lanka to honour its amnesty for 
LTTE fighters and supporters.   
 
5.1 Canada’s Commitment to Disrupting LTTE Terrorist 
Financing 
 
 When it comes to disrupting the flow of funds believed to be leaving Canada and 
ending up in LTTE coffers, Canada is in a delicate situation. First, Canada is committed 
internationally to fighting terrorist financing. This leaves Canada little choice but to act 
decisively when it can be established that funds originating from Canada are used to 
                                                 
81 Professor Noam Chomsky is well-known in social science circles for his work on peace and criticism of 
the Vietnam war (Chomsky, 2009). 
82 Colonel Karuna, a former top LTTE commander who broke away from the group in 2004, is now a 
minister within the Sri Lankan government (J. Perera, 2009c). 
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support acts of terrorism. Second, Canada has a responsibility to listen to its Tamil 
constituents’ concerns over what is happening in Sri Lanka and do what is possible to 
broker a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Third, Canada also has a responsibility 
towards the democratically elected government of Sri Lanka, whereby the maintenance of 
diplomatic ties, the respect of its sovereignty, the support of good governance, human 
rights, economic development, and the well-being of the citizens of that country 
constitute an important aspect of Canada’s foreign policy (CIDA., 2008). Given this, 
Canada must walk a fine line in trying to balance all its obligations while remaining 
allegiant to its tradition and reputation as a peacekeeper. For instance, Canada’s difficult 
situation was evident after it followed suit with the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the European Union in 2006 when it placed the LTTE as a listed terrorist entity.  
Then, in June 2008, Tamil Canadians were shocked when they learned Canada had added 
the WTM to that same list. This prompted thousands of Tamil Canadians to demonstrate 
their discontent with the government’s decision while Sri Lanka and the international 
community welcomed Canada’s actions (Bell, 2008e; Goldstein, 2008; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Sri Lanka, 2008).  
 Obviously, being pulled in opposite directions is problematic for Canada.  
Through the survey conducted for this major paper, nearly 95% of participants 
considered the LTTE as freedoms fighters, and a large majority (82.6 per cent) disagreed 
with any type of police actions taken against the organization. If it were assumed that the 
data obtained through the research was representative of Tamil Canadians’ opinion, 
disrupting LTTE’s fundraising efforts in Canada would likely be very unpopular amongst 
most Tamils.  
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 Given this, what could Canada do to appease all sides and meet its international 
obligations? Based on the survey results, the answer is likely to be unpopular with many 
Canadian Tamils. Canada has no choice but ensure that the LTTE have no opportunity to 
raise funds in Canada. It would be political suicide for the Canadian government to delist 
the LTTE and the WTM only to demonstrate support for its Tamil constituents. Canada is 
fully engaged in fighting terrorism and has signed and ratified many international 
conventions to that effect (United Nations, 1999, 2001). Given the tactics used by the 
LTTE, such as suicide bombings, removing this organization from the terror list would 
not be applauded by most Canadians, or other countries, such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Spain, and others that have suffered from terrorism and are waging a 
war against it. 
 However, as discussed above, the plight of the Tamils is a genuine one. They 
have been victims of discrimination and continuing human rights abuses. Poverty in 
Tamil areas of Sri Lanka is still very much entrenched. Despite this, Canada is not in a 
position to support secession of Sri Lanka and the promotion of an independent Tamil 
state because Sri Lanka is still a democracy and, as such, Canada must respect its desire 
not to divide.  
 In addition, until now, the success police have had in disrupting LTTE financing 
in Canada has been limited. Both Project OSALUKI and Project CRIBLE are examples 
of this. Both investigations were monumental in their scope, lasted many years, and cost 
many man-hours. In the end, there is no doubt that these projects have hurt the ability of 
the LTTE to raise funds in Canada, albeit they have not resulted in a complete cessation 
of this practice. It is, therefore, incumbent upon Canada to step up its efforts to combat 
LTTE terrorist financing if it wants to demonstrate to Sri Lanka that it has taken all 
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possible measures to prevent Canadian funds from being used to fuel the war. Only then 
will Canada have more influence in its appeal to Sri Lanka to provide amnesty to LTTE 
members, address the problem of Tamil rights, and consider federalism. For their part, 
Canadian Tamils should support the Government of Canada and safeguard against 
inadvertently financing the LTTE.  
 
5.2 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
  
 Throughout this research, there has been clear evidence to support the legitimacy 
of the Tamil quest for a homeland, either within a unified Sri Lanka or outside of it, and 
the recognition of the Tamil people as a distinct society. Nonetheless, Canada remains 
deeply concerned about the Sri Lankan government’s pullout from the Cease-Fire 
Agreement and the ensuing humanitarian crisis that resulted from the renewal of 
hostilities between the LTTE and the state. In the final stages of writing this major paper, 
the government’s military action against the LTTE escalated resulting in the killing of 
LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and two of his top commanders (Dyer, 2009; Jane's 
Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 2009; Wax, 2009). With most of the LTTE leadership 
eliminated, the Sri Lankan government finally won its military battle against the LTTE. 
However, despite the euphoria over the military victory and the end of the conventional 
war, the fight against terrorism is far from over (Dyer, 2009).  
 Tamil civilians trapped within the diminishing perimeters held by the last LTTE 
fighters, and who were given the choice of serving as human shields or being shot by 
LTTE, may now be disillusioned about the true aspirations of the LTTE. However, this is 
unlikely the case for many of the Tamils living in the Canadian Diaspora, where LTTE 
support networks remain relatively intact and the goal of an independent Tamil state is 
still very much alive (Dyer, 2009; Scott, 2009). As such, Canada must be prudent in its 
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appeal to the Sri Lankan government to negotiate with whomever becomes the new 
representatives of the LTTE because Sri Lankan officials and TULF Leader 
Anandasangaree believe the LTTE no longer represent all Tamils. Regardless, some sort 
of amnesty for LTTE cadres and addressing Tamil grievances will be necessary if peace 
is to be restored and sustained on the island (Scott, 2009). Failing to do so would likely 
result in the LTTE reverting back to guerrilla warfare and terrorizing Sri Lanka for years 
to come.   
 Canada’s role in the forthcoming months and years will be paramount. First, 
Canada must remain allied with other countries such as Germany, France, and Britain to 
urge the Sri Lankan government to give full and unhindered access to humanitarian aid 
for the thousands of Tamil civilians still interned in refugee camps (Anandasangaree, 
2009). Second, Canada has no choice but to ensure that the LTTE fundraising activities in 
Canada are thwarted. Allowing the Canadian Tamil Diaspora to raise funds for the LTTE 
could jeopardize any hope of a lasting peaceful settlement between Tamils and Sinhalese 
in Sri Lanka (Dyer, 2009).  
 Despite the fact that the great majority of Canadian Tamil Diaspora members 
consider the LTTE freedom fighters, rather than terrorists, Tamil Canadians may have no 
option but to recognize that their financial support to this group must cease ("Ready for 
talks if LTTE down weapons first - President " 2008). However, Tamil Canadians can 
make a difference by unifying their voice with that of Canada to continue advocating 
some sort of federal arrangements for Sri Lanka to adopt. With Sri Lanka adamant about 
not permitting cessation, federalism may be the only reasonable and viable option 
towards obtaining and maintaining peace in Sri Lanka.  
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This survey is strictly for Tamils 18 years of age and older that are living in Canada and/or are Tamil Canadians. Greetings, I am a 
Master of Arts student at the University College of the Fraser Valley, located in British Columbia. I am currently completing my MA 
thesis on Tamil Nationalism in Canada, and I am asking for your assistance in completing a brief on-line survey. The survey will take 
less than 5 minutes to answer and is confidential and anonymous. You may stop at anytime without consequence. In order to maintain 
the integrity of the data, please fill out the survey only once per person. It is my belief that the results of the survey will assist in 
creating a better awareness among the Canadian public of the plight and needs of Tamils living in Canada. Consequently, may I ask 
that you promote this site to other Tamil Canadians you know. 
 
If you have any questions regarding the survey, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about 
participation, please contact my senior thesis supervisor, Dr. Plecas at 604-854-4553. You can also contact Mr. Yvon Dandurand, 
UCFV's Associate Vice-President, Research and Graduate Studies at 604-864-4654 or email him at Yvon.Dandurand@ucfv.ca. Thank 
you for your assistance.
 
 
   
1.  
 
General Questions 
 
What is your gender?
   Malemlj
   Femalemlj
 
 
   
2.  
 
What is your age?
   18-25mlj
   26-35mlj
   36-45mlj
   46-55mlj
   56 and overmlj
 
 
   
3.  
 
What is your marital status?
   Single mlj
   In a long-term relationship but living apart mlj
   Married mlj
   Common-law mlj
   Separated mlj
   Divorced mlj
   Widowedmlj
   Other      mlj
 
   
4.  
 
Where were you born?
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    Sri Lankamlj
   Canadamlj
   India mlj
   Other      mlj
 
 
   
5.  
 
Do you still have immediate family members (i.e. mother, brothers, sisters, etc.) in Sri Lanka?
   Nomlj
   Yesmlj
 
 
   
6.  
 
If you were born outside of Canada, what level of education did you complete before entering Canada?
   Nonemlj
   Some elementary schoolmlj
   Completed elementary schoolmlj
   Some high schoolmlj
   Completed high schoolmlj
   Some universitymlj
   Graduated from university (undergraduate degree)mlj
   Some trade schoolmlj
   Completed trade schoolmlj
   Completed graduate degreemlj
 
 
   
7.  
 
If you were born in Canada, what level of education have you completed?
   Completed elementary schoolmlj
   Some high schoolmlj
   Completed high schoolmlj
   Some universitymlj
   Graduated from university (undergraduate degree)mlj
   Some trade schoolmlj
   Completed trade schoolmlj
   Completed graduate degreemlj
 
 
   
8.  
 
If you were born in Sri Lanka, what region/area are you from?
   Jaffna area and Northern Provincemlj
   Eastern Provincemlj
   Colombo districtmlj
   Other      mlj
 
   
9.  
 
Are you considered a:
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    Ceylon Tamilmlj
   Indian Tamil (Plantation Tamil)mlj
   Tamil Muslimmlj
   Tamil Nadu native (From India's Tamil Nadu state)mlj
   Other      mlj
 
 
   
10.  
 
What languages do you speak? (Check all that apply)
   Tamilfec
   Sinhalafec
   Englishfec
   Frenchfec
   Other      fec
 
 
   
11.  
 
What year did you emigrate to Canada?
   1960 or beforemlj
   1961-1980mlj
   1981-1990mlj
   1991-Presentmlj
   I was born in Canadamlj
 
 
   
12.  
 
If you were not born in Canada, how did you come to Canada?
   As a refugeemlj
   I was sponsoredmlj
   Other      mlj
 
 
   
13.  
 
In which Canadian province or territory do you currently reside?
   Ontariomlj
   Quebecmlj
   British Columbiamlj
   Other      mlj
 
 
   
14.  
 
In a typical year, what is your gross income?
   $24,999 or lessmlj
   $25,000-$49,999mlj
   $50,000-$74,999mlj
   $75,000-$99,999mlj
   $100,000-$124,999mlj
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   $125,000-$149,000mlj
   $150,000-$174,999mlj
   $175,000-$199,000mlj
   $200,000-$299,000mlj
   $300,000-$399,000mlj
   $400,000-$499,000mlj
   $500,000+mlj
 
   
15.  
 
Sri Lanka's Politics 
(Questions 15-18). Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
The Tamils and the Sinhalese can coexist within an island state.    mlj    mlj    mlj    mlj
 
 
   
16.   
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
The Tamils and the Sinhalese can reach a negotiated settlement for the 
establishment of autonomous Tamil Provinces within a United Sri Lanka.
   mlj    mlj    mlj    mlj
 
 
   
17.   
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
The only solution to resolve the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is through an 
armed struggle.
   mlj    mlj    mlj    mlj
 
 
   
18.   
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
The establishment of a "Tamil Eelam" will bring an end to the armed conflict 
in Sri Lanka.
   mlj    mlj    mlj    mlj
 
 
   
19.  
 
Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam 
 
 
Would you consider permanently moving to Sri Lanka if peace were established?
   Nomlj
   Yesmlj
   Poss blymlj
 
 
   
20.  
 
Please select the political structure you would l ke to have if Tamil Eelam were obtained:
   a single-party system (e.g. communism)mlj
   a multi-parti systemmlj
   Other      mlj
 
   
21.  
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(Questions 21-22) Please indicated how much you agree with the following statements: 
 
The Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam are:  
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Freedoms fighters    mlj    mlj    mlj    mlj
A rebel group    mlj    mlj    mlj    mlj
A terrorist group    mlj    mlj    mlj    mlj
 
 
   
22.   
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
In a free and independent Tamil state, I would support the Peace Secretariat 
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam for government.
   mlj    mlj    mlj    mlj
 
 
   
23.  
 
Do you financially contribute to any organizations that support a free and independent Tamil State?
   Nomlj
   Yesmlj
 
 
   
24.  
 
You have answered "Yes" to the previous question. Please specify how you financially contribute (select all the responses that apply).
   I contribute voluntarily fec
   I feel obliged to contributefec
   I am forced to contributefec
   Other      fec
 
 
   
25.  
 
Do you financially contribute to any other cause in Sri Lanka?
   No mlj
   Yesmlj
 
 
   
26.  
 
For what cause(s) do you contribute? (Check all that apply)
   Rehabilitation of IDP (Internally Displaced People)fec
   Building villagesfec
   Education and facilitiesfec
   Culture (Arts, drama, etc.)fec
   Family supportfec
 
 
   
27.  
 
Do you consider yourself to be distinct from a native from Tamil Nadu?
   Nomlj
   Yesmlj
 
   
28. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly 
APPENDIX "A"
105
 
Agree Disagree
Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern Tamil states should join the Indian 
Federation.
   mlj    mlj    mlj    mlj  
 
   
29.  
 
The next two questions relate to media events that recently took place in Canada.  
Please indicated how much you agree with the following statements: 
 
 
I support the police's arrest of a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam money collector on the charges of Terrorism Financing, in Vancouver 
in March 2008? 
 
 
   Strongly Disagreemlj
   Disagreemlj
   Agreemlj
   Strongly Agreemlj
 
 
   
30.    
In general, I concur with the police's actions to target LTTE operatives in Canada.
   Strongly Disagreemlj
   Disagreemlj
   Agreemlj
   Strongly Agreemlj
 
 
   
31.  
 
Additional Comments 
 
How did you find out about my survey? (Please check all that apply)
   From Canadian Tamil newspapersfec
   From Canadian Tamil websitesfec
   From a community leaderfec
   I received an e-mailfec
   From conversation with friendsfec
   Other      fec
 
 
   
32.  
 
Do you have any additional comments?
 
 
   
33.  
 
Did you receive any assistance in completing this survey?
   No mlj
   Yesmlj
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34.  
 
How was the assistance given to you? (Check all that apply).
   Someonne read the questions and/or answers for mefec
   Someone read and answered the survey for mefec
   Someone translated the questions and/or answers for mefec
   Someone helped me with the on-line formatfec
   Other      fec
 
 
   
35.  
 
Who assisted you?
   Familymlj
   Friendmlj
   Other      mlj
 
 
   
36.  
 
 
Thank you for your time in completing this survey 
 
 
Privacy   |   Security 
Surveys  |  Email Marke ing  |  Web Polls 
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Appendix B—Participant Statistics: Univariate Data 
 
Q.1—What is your Gender? (n=272)     
Male 199 73.2%
Female 73 26.8% 
 
Q.2—What is your age? (n=272)     
18-25 41 15.1% 
26-35 64 23.5% 
36-45 75 27.6%
46-55 51 18.7% 
56 and over 41 15.1% 
 
Q.3—What is your marital status? (n=272) 
Single  67 24.6% 
In a long-term relationship but living apart  6 2.2% 
Married  187 68.7
Common-law  4 1.5 
Separated  1 0.4% 
Divorced  3 1.1% 
Widowed 4 1.5% 
Other 0 0.00% 
 
Q.4—Do you still have immediate family members in Sri Lanka? (n=3) 
No 1 33.3% 
Yes 2 66.7%
 
Q.5—Where were you born? (n=270)    
Sri Lanka 249 92.2%
Canada 12 4.4% 
India  1 0.4% 
Other 8 3.0% 
 
Q.6—If you were born outside of Canada, what level of education did you complete 
before entering Canada? (n=255) 
 
None 13 5.1% 
  Some elementary school 24 9.4% 
Completed elementary school 11 4.3% 
Some high school 25 9.8% 
Completed high school 75 29.4%
Some university 16 6.3% 
Graduated from university (undergraduate degree) 46 18.0% 
Some trade school 6 2.4% 
Completed trade school 12 4.7% 
Completed graduate degree 27 10.6% 
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Univariate Data (Cont.) 
 
Q.7—If you were born in Canada, what level of education did you complete? (n=12) 
Completed elementary school 0 0.0% 
Some high school 0 0.0% 
Completed high school 1 8.3% 
Some university 5 41.7%
Graduated from university (undergraduate degree) 3 25.0% 
Some trade school 0 0.0% 
Completed trade school 0 0.0% 
Completed graduate degree 3 25.0% 
 
Q.8—If you were born in Sri Lanka, what region/area are you from? (n=255)  
Jaffna area and Northern Province 218 85.5%
Eastern Province 10 3.9% 
Colombo district 15 5.9% 
Other 12 4.7% 
 
Q.9—Are you considered a: (n=271)   
Ceylon Tamil 240 88.5%
Indian Tamil (Plantation Tamil) 4 1.5% 
Tamil Muslim 0 0.00% 
Tamil Nadu native (From India's Tamil Nadu 
state) 
4 1.5% 
Other 23 8.5% 
 
Q.10—What languages do you speak? (Check all that apply) (n=269) 83   
Tamil 269 100%
Sinhala 74 27.5% 
English 229 85.1% 
French 18 6.0% 
Other 6 2.0% 
 
Q.11—What year did you immigrate to Canada? (n=270) 
1960 or before 2 0.7% 
1961-1980 2 0.7% 
1981-1990 111 41.1% 
1991-Present 143 53.0%
I was born in Canada 12 4.4% 
 
Q.12—If you were not born in Canada, how did you come to Canada? (n=252) 
As a refugee 135 53.6%
I was sponsored 88 34.9% 
Other 29 11.5% 
 
                                                 
83 Please note that a total of 269 participants answered this question and all spoke Tamil. Since participants 
could elect other languages, individual percentages were calculated using 269 as a base.  
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Univariate Data (Cont.) 
 
Q.13—In which Canadian province or territory do you currently reside? (n=263)  
Ontario 250 95.1%
Quebec 1 0.4% 
British Columbia 2 0.8% 
Other 10 3.8% 
 
Q.14—In a typical year, what is your gross income? (n=258) 
$24,999 or less 55 21.3% 
$25,000-$49,999 72 27.9%
$50,000-$74,999 70 27.1% 
$75,000-$99,999 32 12.4% 
$100,000-124,999 13 5.0% 
$125,000-$149,000 6 2.3% 
$150,000-$174,999 2 0.8% 
$175,000-$199,000 1 0.4% 
$200,000-$299,000 2 0.8% 
$300,000-$399,000 0 0.00% 
$400,000-$499,000 2 0.8% 
$500,000+ 3 1.2% 
 
Q.15—The Tamils and the Sinhalese can coexist within an island state. (n=259) 
Strongly Agree 21 8.1% 
Agree 61 23.6% 
Disagree 55 21.2% 
Strongly Disagree 122 47.1%
 
Q.16—The Tamils and the Sinhalese can reach a negotiated settlement for the 
establishment of autonomous Tamil Provinces within a United Sri Lanka. (n=258) 
Strongly Agree 36 14.0% 
Agree 64 24.8% 
Disagree 53 20.5% 
Strongly Disagree 105 40.7%
 
Q.17—The only solution to resolve the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is through an 
armed struggle. (n=258) 
Strongly Agree 77 29.9%
Agree 63 24.4% 
Disagree 71 27.5% 
Strongly Disagree 47 18.2% 
 
Q.18—The establishment of a Tamil Eelam will bring an end to the armed conflict in 
Sri Lanka. (n=258) 
Strongly Agree 167 64.7%
Agree 48 18.6% 
Disagree 26 10.1% 
Strongly Disagree 17 6.6% 
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Univariate Data (Cont.) 
 
Q.19—Would you consider permanently moving to Sri Lanka if peace were 
established? (n=259) 
No 63 24.3% 
Yes 75 29.0% 
Possibly 121 46.7%
 
Q.20—Please select the political structure you would like to have if Tamil Eelam were 
obtained: (n=254) 
a single-party system (e.g. communism) 32 12.6% 
a multi-party system 193 76.0%
Other 29 11.4% 
 
Q.21—The Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam are: 
Freedom Fighters (n=251) 
Strongly Agree 212 84.5%
Agree 26 10.4% 
Disagree 5 1.90% 
Strongly Disagree 8 3.2% 
 
A Rebel Group (n=180) 
Strongly Agree 35 19.5% 
Agree 47 26.1% 
Disagree 29 16.1% 
Strongly Disagree 69 38.3%
 
A Terrorist Group (n=179) 
Strongly Agree 5 2.8% 
Agree 9 5.0% 
Disagree 17 9.5% 
Strongly Disagree 148 82.7%
 
Q.22—In a free and independent Tamil state, I would support the Peace Secretariat of 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam for government (n=248) 
Strongly Agree 166 66.9%
Agree 53 21.4% 
Disagree 22 8.9% 
Strongly Disagree 7 2.8% 
 
Q.23—Do you financially contribute to any organizations that support a free and 
independent Tamil State? (n=233) 
No 125 53.7%
Yes 108 46.3% 
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Univariate Data (Cont.) 
 
Q.24—You have answered [Yes] to the previous question.  Please specify how you 
financially contribute—select all the responses that apply. (n=128) 84 
I contribute voluntarily  99 77.3%
I feel obliged to contribute 23 18.0% 
I am forced to contribute 0 0.0% 
Other 6 4.7% 
 
Q.25—Do you financially contribute to any other cause in Sri Lanka? (n=239) 
No  104 43.5% 
Yes 135 56.5%
 
Q.26—For what cause(s) do you contribute? (Check all that apply) (n=135) 85 
Rehabilitation of IDP (Internally Displaced 
People) 
92 68.1% 
Building villages 73 54.0% 
Education and facilities 98 72.6%
Culture (Arts, drama, etc.) 38 28.1% 
Family support 95 70.4% 
 
Q.27—Do you consider yourself to be distinct from a native from Tamil Nadu? (n=239) 
No 107 44.8% 
Yes 132 55.2%
 
Q.28—Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: 
Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern Tamil states should join the Indian Federation. 
(n=236) 
Strongly Agree 12 5.1% 
Agree 22 9.3% 
Disagree 58 24.6% 
Strongly Disagree 144 61.0%
 
Q.29—I support the police’s arrest of a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam money 
collector on the charges of Terrorist financing, in Vancouver in March 2008? (n=222)  
Strongly Disagree 122 55.0%
Disagree 61 27.5% 
Agree 18 8.1% 
Strongly Agree 21 9.4% 
 
                                                 
84 Please note that the number of respondents who answered this question is 108. A number of those who 
answered “I feel obliged to contribute” also checked that they contributed voluntarily. The “other” option 
was used by respondents to add comments after they checked either one of the first two options.     
85 The number of persons who answered this question is 135. 
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Univariate Data (Cont.) 
 
Q.30—In general, I concur with the police’s actions to target LTTE operatives in 
Canada. (n=219) 
Strongly Disagree 118 53.9%
Disagree 63 28.8% 
Agree 24 11.0% 
Strongly Agree 14 6.3% 
 
Q.31—How did you find out about my survey? (Check all that apply) (n=253) 86 
From Canadian Tamil newspapers 51 20.2% 
From Canadian Tamil websites 27 10.8% 
From a community leader 13 5.1% 
I received an e-mail 99 39.1%
From conversation with friends 32 12.6% 
Other 31 12.2% 
 
Q.32—Do you have any additional comments? 
Total87                                                                                                               110 
 
Q.33—Did you receive any assistance in completing this survey? (n=227) 
No  223 98.2%
Yes 4 1.8% 
 
Q.34—How was the assistance given to you? (Check all that apply). (n=5) 
Someone read the questions and/or answers for me                                                                            0 0.0% 
Someone read and answered the survey for me                                                                                   1 20.0% 
Someone translated the questions and/or answers for me                                                                   2 40.0%
Someone helped me with the on-line format                                                                                         0 0.0% 
Other 2 40.0% 
 
Q.35—Who assisted you? (n=6) 
Family 5 83.3%
Friend 0 0.00% 
Other 1 16.7% 
 
                                                 
86 229 participants completed this section, some of whom selected more than one option. 
87 110 participants volunteered comments in this section. Some of those will later be illustrated.  
Tamil Canadian Nationalism Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WOULD THE RECOGNITION OF A TAMIL EELAM BRING AN END 
TO THE CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA?  
 
Greetings, I am a Master of Arts student at the University College of the Fraser 
Valley, in British Columbia.  I am currently completing a study on Tamil 
Nationalism in Canada, and I need your assistance to complete a brief on-line 
survey. The survey will take less than 5 minutes to complete and is confidential 
and anonymous.  It is my belief that the results of the survey will assist in 
creating a better awareness among the Canadian public of the plight of Tamil 
Canadians along with their needs.  Please note that the survey is strictly 
reserved to Tamils of 18 years of age and older, who are living in Canada and/or 
are Tamil Canadians.  For more information, please visit our website from May 
15th until May 31st, 2008, at www.tamilcanadiansurvey.org   
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